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The international community adopted DDR programs at the end of the Cold War 
in 1989 as a means to end violent conflicts in various parts of world. The traditional DDR 
programs were designed either to disband the defeated enemy forces, or to integrate ex-
combatants where the fighting has not been conclusive. Exclusion of ex-combatants has 
resulted in renewed conflict. This thesis argues that conventional DDR has neglected two 
important aspects that are crucial for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation: 
military integration and a sensitization program. In contrast, an approach that integrates 
former enemy forces and equally reintegrates ex-combatants and government forces into 
civilian society not only ends violent conflict, but also bridges the social gap among 
ethnic groups and, consequently, enhances societal reconciliation. The Rwandan DDRI 
program considers integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes the 
sensitization phase that takes 3-4 months; this has led to stability and reconciliation after 
the 1994 genocide. Ingando is a reconciliation tool that transforms negative perceptions 
that cause ethnic hatred; mitigates conflict influence factors; and manages defeat, shame, 
and remorse on the part of the loser. Therefore DDRI programs that integrate a 
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I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE DDRI IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Civil wars, insurgency, and ethnic conflict continue to plague countries around 
the world.  Unfortunately, neither the “victory” of one group nor “negotiated” settlement 
of the conflict necessarily results in an end to violence.  Violence may resurface if losing 
factions or minority groups conclude that they have lost power or have been excluded 
from the political process.  One method of reaching a lasting peace is to ensure 
participation by all competing factions in a new government.  One aspect of this 
participation is to make certain that the new government’s military forces fully integrate 
members from all parties in the previous conflict. Therefore, a properly conducted 
program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration (DDRI) of 
warring factions is a major aspect of post-conflict security building that ensures 
sustainable stability and reconciliation in societies divested by civil war. This thesis will 
analyze conditions under which the Rwandan case of disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and integration (DDRI) was a success, and covers the period from 1994 to 
2005.  
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Reconciliation and Military Integration 
Reconciliation forms the basis for societal/state reconstruction in post-conflict 
situations.  The main goal of post-conflict reconciliation is to bring together a divided 
society or nation in a way that avoids retribution for all but war criminals. Reconciliation 
promotes the open examination of a painful past and articulates a vision for the future 
based on the interdependence of diverse social, racial, ethnic, or religious groups.1 The 
process of reconciliation provides a mechanism for exploration of truth 
(acknowledgement, transparency, revelation, and clarity) and mercy (acceptance, 
forgiveness, support, compassion, and healing). The purpose of this thesis is to 
                                                 
1 Ken Win K. Smith and David N. Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 
2. 
  2
investigate attempts to reconcile hitherto adversarial groups. Reconciliation also 
recognizes the need to gain time for both justice (equality before the law, making things 
right, and restitution) and peace (harmony, unity, well being, security and respect) to 
occur. Redressing past wrongs should promote social stability anchored in a sense of an 
interconnected future. According to American political scientist John Lederach, 
reconciliation focuses on the point where the past and future meet. He argues that 
acknowledging the past and envisioning the future are necessary to reframe the present. 2 
Although reconciliation embraces the whole society, the current models disregard 
the importance of military integration. This thesis will argue that military integration is a 
major tool to foster reconciliation in post-conflict situations, and that the lack of attention 
to the role of military integration in reconciliation and stabilization represents a critical 
gap in the literature. I will fill this gap by integrating the DDR literature into 
reconciliation literature. 
The literature on reconciliation divides into two conceptual models: the individual 
reconciliation model and the national unity and reconciliation model (NUR). The 
individual reconciliation model involves two individuals, a victim and a perpetrator, 
coming together to discuss crimes committed against the former. Also known as the 
Truth and Reconciliation model, this model operates on a religious paradigm, which 
emphasizes a religious conversion mode of confession, repentance, and forgiveness.3 
According to Lederach, the hatred and prejudice of racial xenophobia are primary factors 
and motivators of conflict. Thus, their transformation must be rooted in social-
psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either 
irrelevant or outside of the competency of international diplomacy.4 Borer argues that 
post-conflict reconstruction requires individual reconciliation, a bottom-up approach or 
grassroots mechanism to foster peace-building and reconciliation.  
                                                 
2 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (United States 
Institute of Peace: Washington, DC, 1999), 29. 
3 Tristan A. Borer, “Reconciliation in South Africa: Defining Success,” Kroc Institute Occasional 
Paper 20: op: 1 (2001), ProQuest; ADDRESS: http://proquest.umi.com/ (October 29, 2005). 
4 Lederach, 29.  
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This approach to peace-building targets local political leaders, NGOs, community 
activists, and health officials, who are enlisted to settle disputes at the local level between 
sub-clans and within clans. Their major concern is to satisfy basic human needs: food, 
shelter, safety, and the need to build new post-conflict relationships. If the grassroots 
population is reconciled, then the popular desire for “normalcy” will filter up to national 
political leaders. American political scientist Edward Garcia notes that transitions 
towards peace in El Salvador, Ethiopia, and in the Philippines emanated from grassroots 
pressure for change.5 Also, peace negotiations in Somalia started as grassroots 
reconciliation conferences, which were adopted by individuals with high government 
profiles and sponsored by the United Nations.6 Nelson Mandela noted that more than 
fifteen truth commissions existed in 1994, including commissions organized during 
democratization in the 1970s in Latin America, Eastern Europe in 1980s and 1990s, and 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1994.7 Because reconciliation 
commissions have worked well in those countries, according to Mandela, he recommends 
adopting the individual reconciliation model. However Eugenia Zorbas offers the 
opposing view that the reconciliation model is a vague concept, if not an impossible goal: 
to forgive and reconcile with someone who destroyed everything that makes life worth 
living, who wiped out family and property, is a pipe dream.8 
The second model of reconciliation is that of national unity and reconciliation. 
Borer argues that the unit of analysis in NUR is not an individual acceptance but rather is 
anchored in social-political institutions and processes, termed as political paradigm.9 This 
model calls for the commitment of victims and perpetrators to respect the law,  
 
                                                 
5 Ed Garcia, Participative Approaches to Peacemaking in the Philippines (Tokyo: United Nations 
University, 1993). 
6 Adebayo Adedeji, “Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts,” the Search for Sustainable 
Peace and Good Governance (1999): 249-251. 
7Lyn S. Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracles or Model? (USA: Lynne 
Reenner publishers, Inc., 2002), 1. 
8 Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” African Journal of legal Studies vol.1 
(2004), ProQuest; ADDRESS: http://proquest.umi.com/ (October 30, 2005). 
9 Borer, 13. 
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procedures, and processes that are laid down by the country’s constitution.  The process 
is a top-down approach to reconciliation and peace building, involving senior military, 
political and religious leaders.  
The success of this model depends on the ability of peacemakers, often seen as 
intermediaries or mediators, normally backed by supporting governments or the United 
Nations. The mediator’s role is to encourage communities to accept reconciliation. This 
model is hierarchical, and requires a functional power structure. It assumes that the 
accomplishments at the high level will be accepted by the rest of the population, as was 
the case in Ethiopia, El Salvador, and Cambodia.10  
Lederach also argues the benefits of what he calls a “middle-out” approach to 
peace-building that appeals to ethnic and religious leaders as well as to NGOs, 
academics, and intellectuals. The middle range leaders occupy a determinant position in 
the society and, if properly integrated, might provide legitimacy for the process of 
reconciliation and sustainable peace. This approach argues that theories and strategies be 
focused on the middle range leadership that can be influential in attempts to end internal, 
protracted conflicts. This approach was also applied to negotiations in Northern Ireland in 
the mid-1990s. Rwanda also adopted the national unity and reconciliation model and 
established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission to oversee the reconciliation 
process. The government is responsible for calming ethnic hatred, eradicating the culture 
of impunity, and uniting Rwandan society.11   
In seeking post-conflict reconciliation, whether adopting an individual or national 
reconciliation model, countries need to determine what sort of justice they will seek: 
retributive or restorative. The retributive model is a typical system of justice based on 
retaliation for a crime. Theophus Smith argues that this is not a type of justice applicable 
in post-conflict situations where many people have been killed and the entire country 
                                                 
10 Lederach, 45. 
11 “Report on the National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation,” National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (18-20 October 2000): 5.             
  5
devastated.12  His reasoning is that, as the aim of reconstruction is to rebuild the nation 
politically, socially, and economically, punitive justice is not the best way to secure these 
goals. This is why southerners were not prosecuted for treason in post Civil War United 
States. If the punishment were to fit the crime in the Rwandan genocide where one 
million people were massacred by hundreds of thousands of the Hutu population then this 
human capital would be tied up in prison, thus defeating the main purpose of post-
conflict reconstruction. This would make the goal of reconciliation unattainable. 
For post-conflict situations, Smith recommends a restorative model that seeks the 
restoration of relationships between the victims and perpetrators. A restorative model 
seeks the integration of the whole society at all levels, which will restore the integrity of a 
society torn apart by a devastating civil war. In seeking both vertical and horizontal 
integration, this type of justice seeks to cut across the different structures or strata within 
the state, while bringing together different cultures and ethnic groups within the society.  
Whether discussing the choice between individual and national reconciliation, or 
between punitive or restorative justice, all these discussions fail to consider the most 
important custodian of violence among the state structures: the military. Military 
integration is not considered as part of the reconciliation process, yet leaving the military 
out of this process is a critical oversight. This thesis will argue that it is fundamental to 
the success of post-conflict reconciliation and stability, for two reasons. First, whether 
defeated or not, ex-combatants still remain a group capable of prolonging violence. 
Leaving them outside of state control perpetuates their potential to threaten the peace, 
while integrating them into a new military structure defuses their potential to 
independently re-engage in violence against the state. Second, in ethnic conflicts, 
different parties or groups feel more comfortable and secure when represented in the 
military of the new government force. Hence, military integration/re-integration is 
important for other negotiations and for the integration in the civilian sector. 
                                                 
12 Theophus Smith, “Vengeance Is Never Enough: Alternative Visions of Justice,” In Roads to 
Reconciliation, Amy Benson Brown and Karen M. Poremski. ed. (United States Institute of Peace: 
Washington, DC, 1999), 35-52. 
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In the initial efforts at reconciliation in South Africa, for example, military 
integration was not given due consideration. For this reason, desertion rates skyrocketed, 
which impacted the process of reconciliation in the civilian sector.13 In post-apartheid 
South Africa, within a matter of months the  government integrated South African 
Defense Forces (SADF) and 34,000 ANC guerrilla forces, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 
Pan African Congress, Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), and homeland 
armies, forming a new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). By the first 
week of November, 5,000 troops had deserted.14 The reason was that the process of 
military integration was not given due attention. Even demobilized soldiers had neither 
proper accountability (government follow-up) nor given a civil education package to 
enable them to fit in the civilian society. The process was revisited after it had caused 
significant instability in the country, thus hindering the smooth process of reconciliation.  
Military integration in Bosnia also failed, prolonging tensions within the civilian 
population. The Bosnian defense force is composed, in effect, of three separate armies, 
each representing one of the ethnic groups, and answering to one of the two defense 
ministers.15 With no unified command structure, each “army” serves the interest of its 
ethnic group with little central control and accountability.  
In Mozambique, the factor that contributed to increased instability since 1992 was 
the fact that UN operations in Mozambique failed to undertake a comprehensive 
disarmament process, leaving a large number of weapons in the hands of demobilized 
soldiers of RENAMO and FRELIMO.16 The NGOs do not have a tradition of giving 
priority to integration/re-integration of ex-combatants. They see this group as “spoilers” 
rather than victims in need. Mozambique’s re-integration process failed in 1992 and this 
caused instability, not only in the country, but also in the region. Jaremey Mc Mullin 
                                                 
13 Report on “South Africa: Military Integration,” Journal Global Strategic Studies, Oxford (1994): 1. 
http://proquest.umi.com/ (October 30, 2005). 
14 Report on South Africa Military Integration, 1. 
15 Peter C. Alexa, et al, “The Democratic Warrior: The future of Bosnia Military,” Baltic Defense 
Review 9 vol. 1 (2003): 148. 
16 Martinho Chachiua, “Internal Security in Mozambique: Concerns Versus Policies,” Institute of 
Security Studies: Africa Security Review vol 9 no 1 (2000), http://www.Internalsecurity-mozambique.htm  
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asserts that Mozambique failed to address two main issues that emanate from poor 
conduct of integration/re-integration: the involvement of certain combatants in organized 
crimes, and political instability caused by re-integration issues.17 Mc Mullin argues that 
instability has hurt Mozambique and has repercussions for South Africa and the 
international community. Michael, F Stephan also believes that, to gain stability and 
reconciliation in Mozambique, its neighbors and fellow members of Southern Africa 
Development Conference (SADC) must pool their collective resources and influence to 
restore and support Mozambique’s re-integration.18 A factious military causes a security 
threat to the entire country, and hinders reconciliation.  
A senior researcher on central Africa in the arms management program, Nelson 
Alusala, stated that, in 1997, the Rwandan government transformed its counterinsurgency 
strategy into a political and social effort that, within a year, broke the back of an 
insurgency of former Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) operating out of eastern Congo.19 
He argues that a key element which undermined the insurgency in northwest Rwanda was 
the integration of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) into the Rwandan Army. 
Insurgents were turned into soldiers; they were given new uniforms, a modest salary, and 
a stake in the country’s future. Rwanda has now integrated and reintegrated 39,000 EX-
FAR and resisters (youngsters recruited to join the rebels in 1997-1998 from the ethnic 
Hutu population). According to Alusala, insurgencies survive when they have popular 
support. By integrating the insurgents into the army, the government cuts the link 
between the insurgents and the population that supports them and gave a boost to 
reconciliation and security in the region.  
If this strategy works in Rwanda, then surely it is transferable elsewhere. In other 
words, the reconciliation within the military was a tangible move towards reconciliation 
of the entire population. However, this strategy does not offer a satisfactory explanation 
                                                 
17 Jaremey Mc Mullin, “ Reintegration  of combatants: were the right lessons learned in 
Mozambique,” International  Relations at New College Oxford  vol 11 no 4 (Winter 2004): 625-643,  
http://www.taylorandfrancis.meapress.com/(wvinj445zhobquj4cgwqiviy)/app/home/contribution...  
18 Michael F. Stephan, “Demobilization in Mozambique,”  (1995): 66, 
http://www.Iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Dismissed/4ms.pdf  
19Nelson Alusala, “Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda’s concern,” Occasional Paper 108, 
(June, 2005). http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/108/papers108.htm (October 24, 2005). 
  8
of conditions under which DDRI becomes a success. Thus, DDRI models and approaches 
highlight different situations under which each model is conducted. 
2. DDRI Models and Approaches   
The aspects of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration 
(DDRI) of ex-combatants are major components of DDRI program. A DDRI program has 
different models designed for different situations. Those models are conducted in two 
main phases: the short-medium phase that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization 
and integration process of ex-combatants, and the long-term phase that deals with 
reintegration process of ex-combatants into civilian life. 
The first DDRI model is the consent based model.20 This model is based on a 
comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties, and is usually 
conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb some 
guerrilla forces or they merge the two warring factions to form a single national military 
force. This concept has been applied in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, 
Guatemala and El Salvador. It is important to note here that although this model of DDRI 
is conducted out of hostilities, the security situation is usually still fragile. This model 
seems to be the most recommended since it includes former enemies in the government 
forces; nevertheless, the poor conduct of DDRI has left these countries with high levels 
of crime carried out by ex-combatants.  
The second case is where the government decides to downsize its military, 
through normal channels of (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) DDR, but 
the model disregards inclusion of the former enemy force. For instance, in 1991, Ethiopia 
demobilized 412,000 former government forces of the Derg regime following the defeat 
of Mengistu Haile Mariam, along with only 88,000 forces of the incumbent regime.21 
The demobilization of all former government forces in Ethiopia created resentment 
among ex-combatants, and then this group decided to join the opposition parties. 
                                                 
20 Mats Berdel, R. Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the 
Termination of Armed Conflicts, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper. 303, 
(Oxford University Press: August 1996): 9. 
21 Kess Kingma. Demobilization in Sub-saharan Africa, Bonn International Centre of Conversion, 
(New York, 2000): 85. 
  9
According to the Ethiopian case, the military victory led to an end to large scale violence; 
however, neither total stability nor societal reconciliation was achieved in the post-war 
period. Similar although a bit different situation was the disbanding of former Iraq forces 
in 2003, which led to the outbreak of insurgency,22 and the disbanding of the former 
Uganda army (UA) following the defeat of President Milton Obote, this has caused an 
endless war in western and northern parts of Uganda since 1986.  
The last is the coercive model of DDR. It involves forced disarmament of 
insurgents and is carried out by external intervention under a United Nations mandate. 
The most recent case was the disarmament of Somalia factions in 1993. In the first phase 
of this operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture a large number of weapons, 
nevertheless, the operation ended in a disaster. So, the intended objectives were not 
achieved in Somalia, that is, to secure the environment for humanitarian operations, 
national reconciliation, and economic reconstruction.23   
Although these dimensions of DDRI have not been properly carried out in the 
past, they form an integral part of the overall post-conflict security building program. 
Failure to effectively conduct DDRI has resulted in a return to hostilities because ex-
combatants are less likely to relinquish their weapons since there is no hope of future 
welfare and survival of individuals and their families.24 For example, the renewed 
conflict in 1992 in Angola was due to poorly conducted DDRI. The other negative 
aspects of poorly conducted DDRI are that there are risks of increased crime, banditry 
and other forms of violence carried out by ex-combatants, as well as small arms 
proliferation, such as in post-apartheid war in South Africa in 1994 and in the post-civil 
war period in Mozambique. Additionally, these negative aspects of poor conduct of 
DDRI not only increase instability and renewed conflict as seen above, but they also 
degrade environment, disrupt economic prosperity and destroy social networks – social 
capital, thus dividing the entire society even more. For instance, the disbanding of former 
                                                 
22 George Packer. The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (United States of America: New York, 2005), 
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23 Berdel, 11. 
24 Mason, Peggy, and Selin Shann, “Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measure,” 
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Iraqi forces not only created insurgency, but also increased the ethnic divide among long-
standing enemies: the Sunni and Shiite. Bernard Mayer states that parties involved in a 
conflict resolution process focus on the behavior dimension and do not address emotional 
and cognitive dimensions of reconciliation. He argues that unless cognitive and emotional 
aspects are addressed in a conflict, it is unlikely that fundamental changes in the 
relationship among conflicting parties will occur.25 
In the models of DDRI mentioned above, none of the approaches has really 
achieved total stability nor provided a powerful explanation for conditions under which a 
DDR program becomes a success in a post-conflict situation. Despite the poor conduct of 
DDRI that has resulted in renewed conflict and related crimes, this thesis argues an 
alternate Rwandan model of ingando that incorporates a comprehensive and intensive 
sensitization program (ingando) in a DDRI program, which is in part a viable approach to 
stability and societal reconciliation. The thesis explores this study in the next chapters. 
Chapter II analyses DDRI in the overall framework of the peace process, by identifying 
benefits and challenges involved. The chapter also shows the anticipated outcomes of a 
well conducted DRRI. Chapter III presents the historical background of ethnic conflict in 
Rwanda, ethnic composition of the military prior to 1994, and also analyzes factors that 
led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda and their impact on the 1994 genocide. 
Chapter IV discusses political, social and military challenges of post-conflict 1994 
Rwanda, and the role of different reconciliation approaches used to address those 
challenges. The chapter lays much emphasis on Rwandan model of DDRI: ingando. 
Lastly, Chapter V links the ingando model of DDRI to reconciliation, stability, military 






                                                 
25 Bernard Mayer. The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A practitioner Guide (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 2000), 231. 
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II. THE DDRI AS PART OF A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS: 
BENEFITS AND OBSTACLES  
…. the legacy of wounded societies and failing states as they emerge from 
years of destructive conflict … the unleashed surplus of war personnel and 
material that is flooding the global market, fueling organized crime, and 
feeding the emerging global security problematique… challenges not only 
the limited capacity of states and international organizations to manage 
conflicts but, also, the ability to monitor and analyze conflict trends.26  
Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the role of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and 
integration (DDRI) in a viable peace process. It analyzes the principal beneficial 
outcomes of applying DDRI as a priority component in a peace process, and then 
highlights some of the constraints that inhibit the success of a DDRI program. To explain 
the concept of DDRI, the chapter first highlights key aspects such as the origin of DDRI 
programs as well as partially successful DDRI cases and challenges.  
1. The Origin of DDR Program 
The concept of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
program appeared in the academic literature towards the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
This program is a brainchild of the international community’s efforts to end protracted 
wars in parts of the world, especially in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia.27 
The international efforts to end civil wars involved programs of disarming, demobilizing, 
and reintegrating soldiers, who have been fighting for a long period of time, into civilian 
life. In cases where fighting has been long and inconclusive, the amalgamation of warring 
factions was an option to end civil war and create a legitimate and locally acceptable 
                                                 
26 Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, “Peace and Conflict:  A Global Survey of Armed 
Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy,” Center for International Development & 
Conflict Management (University of Maryland: Collage Park, 2005): 14.  
27 Mats Berdel, R., “Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the 
Termination of Armed Conflicts,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper. 303, 
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force.28 This aspect, however, of either integrating enemy forces that have only resisted 
defeat or not integrating defeated forces, as well as the failure to consider DDR as part of 
reconciliation, is a critical, frequently neglected dimension in the efforts of the 
international community to restore peace and stability in post-conflict environments. For 
instance, if it is a civil war that is motivated by ethnic marginalization of one group such 
as in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan, then disbanding any of the defeated military forces 
may lead to retaliation and ignite another vicious cycle of conflict. The main objectives 
of any DDR program must be to free up large sums of money hitherto used to support the 
war effort and the human resources involved in fighting, to be used in the social and 
economic development of the war ravaged states. In some cases, DDR programs have 
been partially successful as indicated in the previous chapter. In other cases, however, 
these programs have failed due to dynamics presented by the international system in 
general and also by the parties to the conflicts themselves. 
2. Partially Successful DDR Cases 
Some cases of DDR have been successful, such as the Rwandan case that will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter IV under DDRI and ingando-solidarity camps. This thesis 
argues that a successful DDR program results in stability in every part of the nation, 
allowing individuals to enjoy freedom of movement without restrictions, and 
consequently facilitating reconciliation through social networking as in the of Rwandan 
case. Other cases have only partially succeeded. By this I mean that the program 
managed to end the large-scale violent conflict, but instability still reigned in some parts 
of the country. Thus, such a situation has made reconciliation either difficult or 
untenable. Although DDR programs were successful to some extent in places such as 
Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, there are some cases where a 
DDR program has failed miserably, notably in Angola in 1992 and in Somalia in 1993.  
3. Challenges 
The failure of a DDR program can be partly attributed to challenges presented by 
the fluid structure of an international system in which critical issues necessary for the 
success of the program, such as funding and coordinating DDR activities, become 
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problems. I argue, however, that the most critical challenges emanate from the physical 
and psychological effects of war on the local population, effects that the international 
system is often poorly positioned to deal with. Regardless of the cause of a war, be it civil 
war that is either politically motivated or economic resource driven, the effects on the 
population are identical. The destruction of social infrastructure, the loss of life, trauma, 
hatred, destruction of social networks, and a desire for revenge are common to all wars. 
Certainly, not all of these problems can be addressed by a DDR program. An integrated 
approach to conflict resolution which focuses on cognitive and emotional issues of 
reconciliation, however, forms an essential characteristic of the reconciliation process. 
This is especially the case where the enemy’s image is deeply rooted in the society, as in 
Rwanda, Burundi and, in other societies devastated by war.  
Currently, the DDR program forms an essential component of the security pillar 
of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Those pillars cover four key areas; 
security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, 
economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.29 The essential 
tasks in each pillar are executed in three phase of reconstruction: the initial phase, the 
transformation phase, and the fostering sustainability phase.30 In the quest for a viable 
peace and an attempt to address the challenges faced by DDR, it is imperative to discuss 
the beneficial outcomes of applying a DDRI program. 
B. BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES FROM APPLYING DDRI 
The DDRI model is a useful model to apply when addressing fundamental issues 
that might have caused the war in states formerly weakened or fractured by sectarian 
violence. This is because DDRI possesses the capability to yield stability and 
reconciliation, and military professionalism and representation.  In the realm of stability, 
DDRI converts the conflict war resources into economic development tools. It also 
develops human capital (ex-combatants) and regulates conflict influence factors, thus 
                                                 
29 Robert C. “The United States as a Nation Builder: Facing the Challenges of Post-Conflict 
Reconciliation,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert 
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30 “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 
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providing suitable conditions for societal reconciliation.  From the perspective of military 
professionalism, DDRI has many benefits.  It promotes healthy civil-military relations. 
By doing so, it has the potential to significantly reduce the occurrence of further internal 
strife in states previously afflicted by violent inter-communal conflicts. Furthermore, it 
enhances combat capability and efficiency to protect the nation against external 
aggression. Consequently it encourages representation in the military which gradually 
translates into societal reconciliation. Therefore, in the effort to foster reconciliation 
between former adversaries, DDRI is useful because it enhances social capital and it puts 
a human face on former enemies. 
1. DDRI Promoting Stability and Initial Reconciliation   
DDRI functions as a stabilizing force for the other pillars of reconstruction. 
Integration of ex-combatants into the national military is an affirmative action towards 
initial reconciliation in the institution that possesses the legitimacy to own firearms and to 
use violence in suppressing the real or perceived enemy. Mayer argues that unless the 
ongoing sources of stress that keep people from feeling safe and secure are addressed, 
post-conflict societal reconciliation and reconstruction will not work.31 Thus, initial 
efforts towards peace-building should be geared towards addressing fundamental issues 
of survival and security first. Partly, this may be the only way to guarantee individual or 
group safety and survival which are the fundamental aspect of reconciliation regardless of 
the nature of the war. 
Therefore, stability in post-conflict situations can be achieved through conversion 
of tools of violence into developmental assets. Ex-combatants must be encouraged and 
equipped to cope with and integrate freely into the nation’s developmental economic 
activities. Finally, DDRI helps to address issues related to sources of conflict, such as 
exclusion. 
a. From Tools of Violence to Economic Assets 
The DDRI process converts the ex-combatants who were regarded as 
spoilers into productive economic actors; removes weapons, ammunition and mines from 
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circulation, and redirects resources that have been used to support the war effort towards 
the peacetime economy. Demobilization removes a large number of fighting personnel 
and converts them into a useful economic resource.   
During war, many combatants are engaged in killing innocent civilians, 
raping, and plundering resources. For instance Human Rights reports that in the Darfur 
region in the Sudan, government forces and Janjaweed militia have killed several 
thousands of Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit civilians, and routinely raped women and girls, 
abducted children, and looted tens of thousands cattle and other property.32 Removing 
fighters from the battlefield would reduce human suffering in areas devastated by war. In 
cases where disarmament and demobilization have taken place, these approaches to 
conflict resolution have effectively alleviated human suffering. For instance, in Liberia, 
the UN Mission (UNMIL) disarmed and demobilized 102,000 ex-combatants from 
different factions in 2004.33 The fact, however, is that destruction done by such forces, 
who do not observe the rule of law, is great. Likewise, if this large number of fighters is 
converted into useful economic tools then the economy of the country could rise and 
killings of innocent civilians should stop. Consequently, this would mitigate economic 
causes of conflict, such as scarcity of resources, and hence lay a basis for societal 
reconciliation.  
In Liberia, 28,000 weapons and six million different rounds of 
ammunition were collected from ex-combatants during the DDR process.34 Berdal states 
that the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) collected 300,000 weapons 
and 80 million rounds of ammunition. According to him, over ninety percent of deaths 
and injuries in ninety armed conflicts were caused by small arms. He indicates that 
during Mozambique’s civil war in the 1980s, FRELIMO randomly distributed one 
million AK-47 rifles to the civilian population, of which a large number remain 
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Displaced in Government’s Scorched-Earth Campaign,” Human Rights News, (New York, April 12, 2004), 
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unaccounted for, even sixteen years after the conflict’s end. Also a DDR program 
addresses the problem of land mines – the UN forces provide de-mining services. 
Landmines and antipersonnel mines slow down developmental programs, such as 
cultivation of land and grazing of animals. An estimated 80-110 million mines are 
believed to be planted in sixty countries, mines that cause an estimated 26,000 casualties 
every year.35 All these unleashed war resources cause the deaths of many people and 
heavy casualties of combatants and innocent civilians. If those weapons and mines are 
not controlled, they not only cause severe human suffering, but also make post-conflict 
societal reconstruction difficult. However, this chapter argues that a well conducted DDR 
process sucks all those uncontrolled war resources from the war theatre and restores 
peace and stability in the troubled regions, which creates conditions for possible societal 
reconciliation.  
The other aspect of resource conversion is the release of economic 
resources held in the war fighting zones and of the funds that were used to support and 
sustain the war effort. During civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, a large percentage 
of diamond mine areas were occupied by rebel forces. In Angola, UNITA controlled the 
rich diamond valley of Cuango which yields about 80% of Angola’s total output.36 This 
partly indicates that if those war resources are freed, then they would not only contribute 
to economic development of government structures and institutions, but would also be 
distributed within the population to build social services, create jobs, alleviate poor living 
conditions of individuals, and aid young people to go to school, thus mitigating effects of 
social-economic conditions that may persist, and enhance societal interaction and 
integration.37  
Lastly, DDRI amalgamates warring factions into a single national force. 
This approach promotes security in that all the different ethnic groups should be 
represented in the military, as was the case of Mozambique, South Africa, and Rwanda. 
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The military personnel are not only respectful of the society but also form part of the top-
level group in peace building. John Paul Lederach argues that the military and top 
politicians comprise the top-level leadership in the approaches to peace building and are 
highly visible members of society and by the virtual of their high public status, they can 
have significant power and influence on the conflict resolution and prevention.38 Whether 
defeated or not, however, neglecting the integration of former enemy forces may lead in 
part to the resumption of violent conflict or sophisticated organized crimes. Whereas their 
inclusion into the new military would lead to stability and eventually build social bonds 
and consequently leading societal reconciliation. This aspect of integrating warring 
factions into national forces has been lacking in situations where the former  
government forces have been defeated such as in 1991 in Ethiopia, in Uganda in 1986, 
and in Iraq in 2003. The disbanding of former forces not only creates endless instability, 
but also divides the society. 
To be properly carried out, the DDR process should involve the following 
components:  
-  selection and preparation of assembly area; 
-  planning of logistics, including transport and basic needs supply; 
-  resource mobilization (domestic and foreign); 
-  selection of those who will be demobilized; 
-  cantonment, registration, and disarmament; 
-  needs assessment; 
-  provision of services, such as health care;  
-  pre-discharge orientation and counseling; 
-  discharge and transport ex-combatants in areas of their choice.39 
The design of demobilization exercises, as shown above, is a conventional 
setting of DDR, however, it considers neither the issue of sensitization nor military 
                                                 
38 John Paul Lederach, “Identifying Key Actors in Conflict Situations: Levels of Leadership,” in 
Peace-Building: A Field Guide, ed. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (United States of America: Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2001), 145-155. 
39 Kess Kingma, Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bonn International Centre of Conversion, 
(New York, 2000), 26. 
  18
integration of ex-combatants. Sensitization is teaching and encouraging ex-combatants on 
aspects of reconciliation and other government programs before they are integrated in the 
national military and others reintegrated in the society as elaborated in Chapter IV. See 
also the DDRI model, Figure 2.  
b. Human Capital Development and Reconciliation 
The DDRI process also affects human and economic development. 
Collecting weapons and demobilizing fighters not only stops the killing and maiming of 
innocent civilians, it also stimulates economic development in particular, and stability 
and societal reconciliation in general. The conversion of the hostile situation into a stable 
environment is an important first step for other elements of sustainable stability to take 
place.  
Personnel and weapons are resources that can be transformed into 
elements of economic value. Those ex-combatants are of less economic value because 
they lack skills and education. Their capabilities and skills, however, can be enhanced 
through education and vocational training. As Theodore Schultz argued in 1960, human 
capital is like any other type of capital and can be enhanced through education, training, 
and increased benefits that will lead to an improvement in the quality and level of 
production.40 It is human resource development that enables members of the society to 
quickly learn and interpret reconciliation values for themselves, hence speeding up and 
entrenching reconciliation within the society. Therefore, one of the roles of DDRI is to 
ensure that ex-combatants’ skills and capabilities are developed in order to cope with the 
social, economic, and political development of a post-conflict nation.  
During civil war, insurgents or guerrilla forces conduct unselective 
recruitment of children (boys and girls), orphans, street boys, criminals, and prisoners. 
Recruiters go for mostly weak and vulnerable targets who have no alternative way of 
living or who enjoy handling a gun as a way to earn respect and a living. Most of those 
elements possess neither skills nor education. The post-conflict situation is characterized 
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by ex-combatants most of whom have spent more than ten years fighting and possesses 
no other skills except killing. Some do not have relatives while others do not know where 
they came from because they joined the war when they were still young. Also among 
them are children, young women who are either pregnant or nursing, and old men and 
women.41 These categories of people present a great challenge in post conflict stability 
and societal reconciliation, and economic and political development as well. 
One of the tasks of a DDR program is to transform the above mentioned 
groups of people into productive factors for economic development. Although the aim of 
DDR is to improve the welfare of the whole group, it has been noted that the programs 
often focus on male combatants and neglect children and women. Failure to attend to and 
address problems of female and young soldiers is as dangerous as ignoring the adult male 
combatants. During DDRI in Liberia in 2004, out of 102,193 who were registered, 22,400 
were female adults, 8,792 were male children, and 2,561 were female children.42 This 
number is large enough that if not taken care of, it may equally hinder societal 
reconciliation and may also cause instability within communities. In 1995 Rwanda, the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) assembled all children below eighteen years. Most of 
those were either victims of war or made orphans by the genocide in particular, and they 
were taken to school. The military provided for their welfare, studies, and school 
requirements, and some have completed their undergraduate studies and are now 
employed by the government. Women, some men, and disabled ex-combatants all went 
through the normal process of DDR. After disarmament and demobilization most of the 
ex-combatants including disabled ex-combatants joined Muvumba vocational training 
school in Nyagatere district of the eastern province. They were taught business 
management, carpentry and tailoring. Others joined high institutions of learning on 
government sponsorship. This emphasis on training/education accounts in part for the 
current stability in Rwanda.   
Care must be taken during the reintegration process and actors should not 
show or treat ex-combatants differently from the rest of society where they are resettled. 
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If not, this special treatment will create resentment in the civilian population and inhibit 
social integration. At times the ex-combatants are settled side by side next to their victims 
who blame their fate on those ex-combatants. So, special treatment of ex-combatants will 
be regarded as rewarding killers, and with time this would create instability and inhibit 
societal reconciliation. In this case, therefore, reintegration process should be 
synchronized with other stability operations and DDR should form an integral part of the 
overall stabilization and reconstruction operations of the local government.  
A Dutch economist Kees Kingma indicates elements that constitute 
resettlement and reintegration support program. These are elements that range from “cash 
payment, health care, school fees for children … to managerial and technical training.”43 
Kingma’s components of resettlement/reintegration are elements of an ideal case 
scenario, which may seem misleading if practitioners and donor communities perceive it 
as current reality on the ground. Yet, most of those elements have been regarded as 
shortfalls that may account for partial failure of DDR in general as seen in Chapter I and 
in reintegration in particular.  
2. DDRI as a Facilitator of Military Professionalism 
So far, this chapter has addressed issues that enhance stability in terms of those 
that deal with the conversion of tools of violence into economic assets and human capital 
development. For viable peace and sustainable reconciliation, however, a post-conflict 
government also needs to restructure and professionalize its military. Military 
professionalism is a hallmark of the military organizations of the world's great 
democracies. In a post-conflict situation, the government concerned needs to organize 
and restructure its military both qualitatively and quantitatively. The nation has to align 
those changes in order to suit the nation’s economic and security needs. It must also at 
least restructure its military in accordance with structures and norms of other militaries 
for ease of cooperation in terms of training and acquisition of equipment. In doing so, it 
embraces democratic values to include integration as well reconciliation in all state 
structures and institutions, rather than promoting either racial and ethnic, or regional 
military that has been the source of atrocities and society division in the underdeveloped 
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and developing nation as will be discussed in Chapter III. However, as DDRI promotes 
inclusion in the military, this enhances military professionalism. Consequently, the 
inclusion and cooperation within the military set a good example for the civilian 
population through social relations, hence facilitating reconciliation.  
a. Military Professionalism Enhances Military Effectiveness 
DDRI lays the foundation for military professionalism in post conflict 
situations because the newly integrated military is a representation of the entire society. 
Samuel Huntington suggests three prerequisites for developing and maintaining a 
professional military: 1) existing nation state; 2) a system of strong democratic structures 
and ideas; 3) existence of a single and widely accepted authority over the armed forces.44 
Although DDRI is one element in post conflict reconstruction, it has a profound impact 
on the three conditions necessary for military professionalism to take place. For instance, 
U.S. political scientist Herbert Howe argues that the most important necessary condition 
for a nation state is to discourage ethnic division in the military, in particular, as well as 
in other government structures. He states that sub-Saharan African states cannot be 
labeled nation states but nations, because they have been characterized by ethnic division 
and regionalism.45 In contrast, Rwanda has developed both a nation state and a 
professional military after the 1994 genocide. These achievements are partly attributed to 
integration of former Hutu government forces (ex-FAR),46 which in turn facilitated 
societal reconciliation. Now, the nation has minimized the negative tendencies that 
emanates from ethnic division. 
Military professionalism is an essential factor for sustainable post-conflict 
stability and reconciliation; it facilitates development of an organized and combat 
efficient military, as well as promoting healthy civil-military relations. Post-conflict 
militaries should possess the capability to defend the nation from external and internal 
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aggression. Huntington offers three characteristics that distinguish a profession from 
other vocations: expertise, responsibility and corporateness.47   
According to Huntington, expertise is acquired through general learning 
and training for specialized knowledge and skills. This expertise is a function of regular 
theoretical instruction and practice. U.S. researcher on contemporary issues in Asia and 
Pacific Muthiah Alagappa states that: “professional expertise is acquired through 
prolonged education and experience.”48 The only distinguishing factor between the 
military profession and other professions is the military’s skill of managing violence. In a 
post-conflict situation, these are required to defend the nation against external and 
internal aggression. Hence, a professional military will create a sustainable stability 
environment that will enable socio-economic development to take place as well as unity 
within a society.  
The second characteristic of the military profession is its responsibility to 
protect the society and the state. A professional military man performs service to the 
society and his client is the society. Objectively, an ethnic oriented military cannot 
protect the entire society; instead, it protects the interests of the ethnic group it comes 
from. For example, the Rwandan military (ex-FAR), prior to 1994 protected the interests 
of the Hutu population and the government periodically used it to kill the Tutsi, up to the 
1994 genocide. Likewise, the Burundi military was dominated by Tutsi, and was used to 
coerce the Hutu ethnic group.49 Thus, military integration addresses those gray areas that 
would inhibit the military’s responsibility to protect the entire society. In this case a 
professional integrated military recruits from different groups of the society, they train 
and eat together, sleep in the same halls. This kind of interaction creates  
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involuntary/unconscious reconciliation in the military. Because the military is a symbol 
for protection and representation of the society, its reconciliatory effects will influence 
the societal reconciliation. 
The other aspect of military professionalism is that it concentrates on 
training in order to be efficient in carrying out duties, unlike all ethnic oriented military 
who train for domestic deployment. In this case a professional military generates the 
competence and efficiency in as far as providing security is concerned.  For instance in 
only twelve years, the integrated military in Rwanda has developed a professional 
military that has provided sustainable stability along its borders and currently is assisting 
other countries in their efforts to attain peace and stability. The U.S. Ambassador to 
Rwanda Michael R. Arietti stated that, “….Rwanda is contributing to peace through its 
role in Darfur, where they have over 2,000 troops participating in AU (African Union) 
mission there. They [Rwandans] are very effective and highly regarded and have been an 
important force in stopping the Genocide in Darfur.”50  
Motivation, combined with a code of ethics grounded in custom and 
tradition, rather than financial compensation, constitute the driving force of the military 
officer’s conduct and set the military professional apart from a mercenary.51 Those 
military values create a sense of responsibility to serve the entire society rather than one 
ethnic group, which filters to the populations through relatives and friends and this 
significantly impacts the social relations within the civilian population. This may in part 
account for the unifying effect of the military that translates into societal reconciliation. 
Also this may help to explain how an integrated professional military bridges social 
bonds of different ethnic groups within a society.   
The last characteristic of a profession is corporateness. Huntington argues 
that members of a certain profession have a sense of organic unity and perceive 
themselves as a group different from laymen. In the military this commonality and esprit 
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de corps originates from prolonged training and discipline necessary to make it 
competent. This sense of unity, esprit de corps, common duties and responsibilities, 
ethics and values are universal traits of the military that make it easier for two warring 
factions to integrate. However, this argument does not explain conditions under which a 
professional military integrates insurgents who are ill-trained and who do not possess 
characteristics of a professional military. Those traits, however, offer no guarantee that 
military integration is always possible in a post conflict situation. This thesis argues that 
reconciliation goes beyond normal criteria of integrating elements of similar qualities and 
makes it possible to integrate a professional military with insurgents. In some cases 
however, military integration may fail, not because of the hatred between the warring 
factions but due to the failure on the part of the politicians who want to further their 
interests and also their failure to understand these unique characteristics of military 
professionalism.  
Despite those political constraints, however, military integration remains a 
strong catalyst for societal integration and reconciliation. Military professionalism creates 
an organized and efficient military that is capable of serving the society and the state by 
defending them from internal and external aggressors. For the military to be more 
effective and productive, however, there is a need to bridge the gap between the military 
and civilians in their endeavor to reconstruct the nation in a post-conflict situation, thus 
promoting healthy civil-military relations. 
b. DDRI, Healthy Civil-Military Relations and Societal 
Reconciliation 
Military integration builds a representative and professional military 
which is not easily manipulated by politicians for their own interests. In accomplishing 
this task, military integration and professionalism have the potential to significantly 
reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by violent 
inter-communal conflicts, and enhance a combat effective military that is able to protect 
the nation against external aggression.  
Military professionalism is acquired through learning and, in turn, 
enhances military effectiveness. Civil-military relations signify the subordination of the 
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military leadership to a legitimately elected civilian rule. The military is an organization 
with a set of ethics and values, and specialized knowledge and skills that enable it to 
effectively carry out its roles. In the past, those characteristics and traits have been 
peculiar to military organizations and the civilian rule has been not fully aware of them. 
To effectively control or guide someone, demands a thorough knowledge of his/her tasks. 
The ignorance of civilian rule about military tasks and the military’s expertise, coupled 
with its ignorance of civilian policies, has not only created a gap, that is, friction between 
the two organizations, but also superiority and inferiority complexes as well. As a result 
of those disparities, civilian rule has deliberately politicized the military, especially in 
African states, thus rendering the military unprofessional, as what Samuel P. Huntington 
terms as subjective civilian control.52 Therefore, the military focus shifted from its 
universal role and responsibility of protecting the nation against external aggression to an 
effective tool of killing innocent civilians that they are supposed to serve and protect.   
This approach of civilian control of the military, however, has not bridged 
the civil-military gap, instead it paved the way to a series of military interventions in the 
1970s in Nigeria, in Rwanda in 1973, in Burundi and Zaire, as well as parts of Latin 
America. Also, in the developed world, the civil-military relations’ gap prevails because 
the civilian leadership has decided to militarize (professionalize) the military thus making 
it entirely a war machine, which is what Samuel P. Huntington describes as an objective 
civilian control of the military.53 This inhibits free interaction and the sharing of 
knowledge by civilian and military on matters pertaining to civilian policies and military 
tasks. 
The modern battlefield, however, increasingly demands that both the 
military and civilians know each other’s tasks and how they can enhance military 
effectiveness, especially in stability operations. Also, the success of a military campaign 
is a function of synchronized national elements of power, so, the support of the civilian 
leadership and society are critical to this success.   
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American political scientist Karen Guttieri argues that the current 
challenges facing the military in the conduct of stability operations suggests that military 
education has done little to military effectiveness in this field.54 Her argument, however, 
contrasts with what Huntington contend is objective civilian control of the military, 
which achieves its aim by militarizing the military thus, insulating the civilian rule from 
military intervention.55 Whereas Huntington’s argument holds true in as far as the 
military’s ability to defeat external aggression is concerned, nonetheless his argument 
shadows the reality of the contemporary issue of modern war whereby the military is 
required not only to have specialized knowledge and skills peculiar to it, but also general 
knowledge surrounding the conflict in particular as well. As Guttieri points out 
“Education implies the acquisition of general knowledge and skills required for 
effectiveness as opposed to training which implies preparations to perform specific 
functions, tasks or missions.” She also argues that from the military perspective this 
general knowledge enhances civil-military relations as well as combat effectiveness.56  
Furthermore, since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold 
War, most wars fought, especially in Africa, were “intra-state” wars rather than “inter-
state” wars. As a result Huntington’s argument does not fit the context of contemporary 
wars fought and stability operations in particular, in which the military has been 
increasingly involved. Consequently, a post-conflict environment demands a common 
understanding of civil-military relations’ dynamics for both the military and civilians. 
Also, both civilian and military leadership should know how to cooperate in order to 
attain goals of post-conflict stability operations. Similarly, Guttieri suggests that 
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military leaders is essential for promoting good civil-military relations because it enables 
civilians to effectively manage national security matters and the military to implement the 
policies effectively.57   
In a post-conflict environment, however, some military personnel may be 
appointed to civilian posts in the government, especially in the initial and transformation 
phases of post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The reason is that in such a 
fragile security situation, the military personnel are readily available, disciplined and 
constitutes a large number of the elite group at the time, as was the case in the aftermath 
of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After the genocide, the military was employed in 
different sectors of the government including the cabinet and the parliament. By that 
time, capable people had died in the genocide, others were still in exile as either political 
refugees or normal refugees held in then Zaire by interahamwe militia and ex-FAR. 
However, as the transformation phase was approaching, the military personnel were 
withdrawn and replaced by civilians. 
Also, the Rwanda civilian support of a military campaign in DRC (former 
Zaire) in 1996-1997 indicates good civil-military relations. Despite the combat 
effectiveness of the Rwanda Defense Forces, the support of the Rwandan civilian 
population legitimized the war and greatly contributed to the successful military 
intervention in the giant nation Zaire. The military campaign in the DRC destroyed 
interahamwe militia and ex-FAR and this eventually led to the ousting of President 
Mobutu. However, this did not guarantee consistently good civil-military relations in 
Rwanda because, as Michael C. Desch states, civil-military relations is a function of 
location and intensity of the threat. He argues that depending on the intensity of the threat 
and where that threat comes from, that is, either internal or external threat will rate civil-
military relations as good, poor, mixed, or worst:58 
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Figure 1.   Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity 
of Threats  
 
 
Also, Huntington supports this claim that “anti-governmental war 
encourages civil-military relations different from those simulated by interstate conflict. 
Other things being equal, the more a state achieves a system of objective control the more 
effective it is in providing for its external security and in conducting foreign wars.”59   
Finally, as General Fred F. Woerner (retired) notes, civil-military relations 
in emergent democracies has great challenges: 1) it signals the full integration of the 
military into democratic society; 2) it also signals the mutual development by the civilian 
and military authorities of the missions for armed forces that address the role of the 
military in peace and war within a democratic context; 3) lastly, it signals a break within 
a historical tradition of the military rule and replacement by a relatively new pattern in 
which the armed forces are subordinated to the democratically elected civilian control.60 
In sum, all these arguments are oriented at achieving stability in the nation as well as 
societal unity and inclusion.  
In conclusion, a professional integrated military is a legitimate and widely 
acceptable military, and it is a representation of the entire society. Thus a professional 
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integrated military has the potential to enhance good civil-military relations, unlike an 
ethnically recruited military which has, in the past, been a source of human rights abuse 
and serves interests of particular groups within the society. The Rwandan genocide is not 
only a clear manifestation of the dangers of an exclusive military, but also a hindrance to 
good civil-military relations as well as democratic values. 
Therefore, DDRI not only promotes stability, military professionalism, 
and healthy civil-military relations but also encourages representation as well as societal 
reconciliation, a window of opportunity rarely exploited in DDR/I programs.   
C. CONCLUSION 
DDRI forms a central component of social reconciliation, that is, the integration 
of former enemies into a national forces and proper reintegration of ex-combatants in the 
civilian society is an initial affirmative action towards societal reconciliation. In post-
conflict situations, such affirmative actions should be initiated primarily by the side that 
has more initiative: the victor. 
In post-conflict environments, state structures enforce the rule of law within a 
divided society, that is, people are forced to respect the law and stop violence. 
Nevertheless, those national institutions can neither force victims and perpetrators to live 
side by side nor can they force social interaction within the society. In this case the 
conflict will remain latent. Military integration, however, is one way to lift latent tension 
and fear, and restore hope and unity within a divided society. Thus, military integration 
forms an essential means for building social capital and societal reconciliation in post-
conflict situations.   
Therefore, DDRI programs provide space for reconciliation, a window of 
opportunity rarely exploited in DDR programs, and this explains, in part, why there are 
some cases of renewed fighting after signing peace accords such as in Angola in 1992. In 
addition, reconciliation is a major factor for the success of post-conflict security building 
in general. However, those affirmative actions alone are not enough to ensure consistency 




an integral part of the national constitution and sensitization program. Also a follow-up 
on implementation has to be made as well as periodic evaluations of impact of 
reconciliation on the unity of the society.  
This chapter discussed DDRI in a search for a viable peace. It analyzed obstacles 
and benefits of DDRI programs. The chapter also discussed how DDRI promotes 
stability, military professionalism and inclusion. In sum, military integration is a force 
that overcomes fear and restores hope, builds societal cohesion, enhances social capital 
and ensures a sustainable peace and stability in a post-conflict situation. The next chapter 
will present a brief historical background of ethnic conflict in Rwanda. It will analyze 
ethnic composition of the Rwandan military prior to 1994 and factors that led to an 
unprofessional military in Rwanda in the same period. Also the chapter will discuss the 




















III: THE MILITARY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN RWANDA: 
WHO KILLED WHOM?  
The previous chapter discussed disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and 
integration (DDRI) in a viable peace process. It also highlighted some of the constraints 
that can inhibit the success of DDRI programs. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the principle 
beneficial outcomes of applying DDRI in the search for a viable peace in a post-conflict 
situation. However, to understand the background of the successful military integration of 
warring factions and its impact on stability and societal reconciliation in the Rwandan 
case that will be discussed in Chapter IV, Chapter III will highlight the source and 
dynamics of the Rwandan conflict in general and the military’s role in the Rwandan 
conflict in particular. Thus, this chapter will discuss the nature of ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda. It will also assess the ethnic composition of the Rwandan military, as 
well as factors that led to the deterioration in military professionalism in Rwanda 
between 1959 and 1994. Lastly, the chapter will analyze the role of an ethnically 
homogeneous military in the 1994 genocide as well as its impact on post-conflict DDR in 
Rwanda.   
This chapter does not intend to implicate any one ethnic group, but rather to 
clarify ambiguities underlying ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Furthermore, the chapter will 
answer questions that appear in the current discourse and general rhetoric surrounding the 
Rwandan conflict after the genocide: Specifically, who was responsible? And how and 
why can civilians engage in mass killings of their neighbors? This chapter argues, 
however, that the responsibility for genocide can be laid at the feet of an ethnically 
homogenous military that not only prepared and executed ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, 
but that also propagated ethnic hatred before, during, and after the genocide.       
A. ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN RWANDA 
In Rwanda, artificially contrived and nurtured notions of ethnicity are linked to 
past violent conflicts, as well as to the creation and utilization of an ethnic oriented 




Rwanda: the Hutu, the Twa and the Tutsi. This chapter presents the typology of ethnicity 
and ethnic conflict in Rwanda in three distinct periods: the pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial eras. 
1. Ethnicity in Pre-Colonial Rwanda: Myth or Reality? 
The three social groups existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, but the question is 
whether these groups were cohesive ethnic groups or mythological constructs given to the 
Rwandan society during the colonial era. Pre-colonial Rwanda was characterized by a 
highly organized and centralized kingdom presided over by Tutsi kings. French political 
analyst Gerard Prunier argues that the king “was the apex of the three different levels of 
human actions which were deeply enmeshed and not praised apart, that is, it was an 
entangled system of political, cultural and economic relationships. This system was 
described as intertwined fingers.”61 The central government was manned by the Abiru 
through a complex and secret polity known as ubwiru. The Abiru were ritual loyalists 
who lived in the king’s palace. Their purpose was to explain occurrences and forecast the 
future. For instance, the Abiru alone could secretly determine the next king and define his 
mission during his reign.   
These social, political, and economic actions in the kingdom were centrally 
controlled by the king through three different kinds of chiefs: the cattle chiefs, the 
military chiefs, and the chiefs of land. The chiefs of cattle and military were 
predominantly Tutsi, while the land chiefs were Hutu. The Twa were involved in pottery, 
hunting and gathering, and served as employees in the king’s palace and in the chiefs’ 
homes. Rene Lemarchand argues that the relationship between the king and the 
population was unequal and parasitic while the relationship among the ordinary Tutsi, 
Hutu, and Twa was symbiotic.62 Like any central government, however, the core part of 
the kingdom had to devise means of control and extraction of resources from the 
population for its survival. In turn, the central power provided protection against external 
aggression and prevented internal strife. 
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The Rwandan kingdom in the pre-colonial period and even during the colonial era 
had a military recruited from among the three social groups. Prunier highlights three roles 
of the pre-colonial military in Rwanda: defending the kingdom against external enemies, 
extending the kingdom by conquest, and raiding cattle from neighboring kingdoms such 
as Ankore kingdom in Uganda.63 Based on these roles, the military’s mission in the pre-
colonial period suggests that Rwanda’s military shared some characteristics with the 
modern professional military, as it possessed both political responsibility to the nation 
and served the interests of the society.64  
American political scientist Christine P. Scherrer argues that in pre-colonial 
Rwanda the three social groups shared many things in common; the seventy largest clans 
in Rwanda were shared by the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa; there was intermarriage between the 
groups; there were also known cases of swapping of adherence as a means of social 
advancement. Lastly, the procedure of kwihutura transformed the Hutu lineage into Tutsi; 
kwihutura means rejection of Hutu-ness after acquiring a different social status; this 
turned many Hutu into Tutsi.65 The classification of the three groups of people in pre-
colonial Rwanda, however, remains a mystery because contemporary scholars on 
Rwandan history such as Rene Lemarchand, Gerard Prunier, Jan Vansina, and Christian 
P. Scherrer fail to explicitly categorize those groups into castes, tribes, or ethnic groups. 
Yet, the literature mentions of the change from one social status to the other which in turn 
determined where an individual belonged. Nonetheless, there is no historical record of the 
conflict between the three groups in pre-colonial Rwanda, which may justify the 
contemporary connotation or significance of ethnicity. Therefore, because of such 
admixture in the clan system, swapping of adherence, lineage shift, and no record of 
conflict among the three groups, partly may help to explain why these groups of people 
lacked an element of ethnicity.   
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The inclusion of the three groups in the political structure of the kingdom, and the 
composition and the mission of the military in pre-colonial Rwanda, indicate not only an 
organized and coherent society, but also that the social group names of Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa had no ethnic significance, since there was social mobility among the groups. 
Rather, they described social division of the means of production. Unlike the social 
mobility between the Hutu and the Tutsi, however, there is no situation where a Twa 
became either a Hutu or a Tutsi, or vice versa. Nevertheless there were some anomalies, 
where Twa married Tutsi and their siblings were called Bashyete. While it is unclear 
whether the Bashyete are Tutsi or Twa, what is known is that they were aligned more to 
the Tutsi than to the Twa.  
2. Colonial Era 
The colonial era in Rwanda was marked by three different periods: European 
advancement of the notion that the Tutsi were a superior race and the Hutu inferior, 
followed by a shift in this strategy to advancing the Hutu over the Tutsi, and finally the 
1959 Hutu revolution. 
The early Europeans who came to Rwanda, either as explorers like John Hanning 
Speke and Sir Samuel Baker, or as the missionaries such as Father van den Burgt, John 
Roscoe and Father Gorju, all created different but rather complementary hypotheses 
tracing the origin of the Tutsi from the north of Africa. They hypothesized that the Tutsi 
might have either come from Ethiopia, Egypt, Melanesia or Asia Minor. They also 
argued that the Hutu and Twa were indigenous peoples conquered by a superior race and 
the carrier of a superior civilization, the Tutsi.66 Therefore, the Tutsi were inherent 
leaders and the Hutu were born to be ruled.  
The Europeans also insisted that the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa had distinct 
anthropological features. For instance, Father van den Burgt, the first German missionary 
to arrive in Rwanda in 1894 reported that “we can see Caucasian skulls, and beautiful 
Greek profiles side by side with Semitic and Jewish features, elegant golden-red beauties 
in the heart of Ruanda,” the Tutsi.67 In his report, however, Father Burgt possibly was 
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trying to fantasize the lost tribes from Europe as many Europeans were obsessed in 
differentiating people according to their ancestors, that is, from the three sons of Noah: 
Sham, Japheth and Ham.68 The “Blacks” were believed to be descendants of Ham; their 
color was due to the curse on Ham’s descendants because he saw his father naked.69 
The policies of inclusion in the political and military structures in Rwanda, 
however, were manipulated by the colonialists to further their interests either 
unconsciously, by thinking that the Tutsi led kingdom would continue to cooperate with 
the colonial rule, or consciously, in anticipation of uncooperative Tutsi rule. In this case, 
praising the Tutsi as a superior race and downplaying the importance of the Hutu and 
Twa created major cracks in the social cohesion of Rwandan society as well as 
stereotyping ethnic identities. The early Europeans who saw the organized polities of the 
Rwandan kingdom led by a Tutsi king and the light skin of the Tutsi, thought that the 
Tutsi were different people who might have migrated from civilized cultures.70 This 
theory with the subsequent theories of the origin of the Tutsi was manipulated by the 
colonial rule to create distinct division among the three social groups. Partly, this may 
help to explain the genesis of the distinction and ethnic awareness of the three social 
groups, as well as, the origin of “Hamitic myth and theory” in Rwanda.  
Thus, praising and widely publicizing the Tutsi as a superior race coupled with 
the social constructs stereotyped by the colonial rule greatly impacted the social relations 
among the Rwandans as well as the subsequent rearrangement of the social and political 
organization of the Rwandan society. Prunier asserts that the stereotype identities and 
social constructs given to Rwandans and embraced by the colonial rule “ended up 
inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing the Hutu feelings until they 
developed an aggressive resentful inferiority complex.”71   
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In the 1930s, the colonial administration had conducted a census for the three 
ethnic groups based on alleged physical characteristics, such as length of nose and other 
angular features of the face, and the number of cows each person possessed. After the 
census, those who had ten cows were registered as Tutsi, while those with less than 10 
cows became Hutu.72 The Twa were few and they were identified by their social 
occupation. Immediately, identity cards were issued indicating each person’s ethnic 
group. On the basis of this ethnically charged and scientifically suspect survey, all 
Rwandans came to be registered at birth as belonging to a certain ethnic group. At this 
time, previously fluid ethnic boundaries became solid, social bonds among the Rwandans 
were destroyed, and social mobility halted.  
At the same time, there was a shifting paradigm in the colonial administration 
between the 1930s and 1940s. The colonial rulers in Rwanda abandoned the strategy of 
supporting the Tutsi. Instead, they came to despise them, which translated into an open 
and intensive support of the Hutu in what was called Hutu emancipation. To Rwandan 
leaders, this was a major concern which prompted them to question the rule of a nation 
that encouraged ethnic division and the foreseeable consequences. As a result the Tutsi 
chiefs were replaced by a Hutu chief, and king Musinga was exiled and was replaced by 
his son Rudahigwa in 1931.73 
This situation signaled the beginning of change in the social relations of the 
Rwandans. In addition, Prunier points out that, by the 1940s, the lives, actions, and 
feelings of the Rwandans were following the logic of a script rather than that of their 
complex organic past, which by then was consigned to a distant historical memory.74 As 
a result, the social fabric of Rwanda was destroyed; social mobility frozen, ethnic identity 
encouraged, and ethnic hatred created and entrenched. Concurrently, an ethnically 
homogenous military was instituted to preserve the Hutu status quo for the next thirty 
years.  
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Indeed, the end of the colonial rule and the beginning of the Hutu republics were 
periods of Tutsi exile and periodic massacres. This is to say that towards the end of 
colonial rule in Rwanda, the seeds of ethnic hatred had sprouted and yielded its first 
harvest: the 1959 Hutu revolution.  This Hutu revolution killed many Tutsi and forced 
others into exile. The revolution marked the end of the monarchy in Rwanda and the 
beginning of the Hutu regime. Therefore, the national military was ousted and the new 
Hutu military was created in the midst of hatred and ethnic division. 
3. Post-Colonial Rwanda 
The Belgian administration granted Rwanda independence in 1962, and during 
the next two Republics, periodic massacres of the Tutsi indicated that a heritage of ethnic 
hatred had become one of the enduring legacies of colonial rule. The Tutsi diaspora that 
had been created in the aftermath of the 1959 revolution were not allowed to come back 
into the country, and those Tutsi who remained in the country were subjected to political, 
economic and social marginalization, and made second-class citizens. Tutsi elites in 
Rwanda were periodically checked by selective state-sponsored killings in 1963, 1973, 
1982, and 1990.75 
At independence, the military had not been dominated by the Hutu. Lemarchand 
states that “within the army, a sense of national mission transcended regional or 
economic interests or kinship ties.”76 Yet the post-colonial Hutu government that had 
come to power during the 1959 revolution systematically eliminated most Tutsi from the 
national military. 
Yet when the Belgians withdrew, they left in place a Hutu-dominated government 
that reigned for thirty years, but which would not have survived for so long without the 
support of a Hutu-dominated military. Most officers and troops of the first Hutu military 
had been recruited from the northern part of Rwanda, especially Bushiru, because the 
colonial regime regarded the Bashiru taller and stronger than Hutu from other regions of 
the country. Later the military were denied incentive and their rights from president 
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Kayibanda and politicians who became a central part of Rwanda in Gitarama.77 This 
created friction within the army between Bashiru and non-Bashiru military personnel, 
and between the Bashiru military officers and politicians who were predominantly from 
Gitarama. As those politicians continually sought civilian control over the military 
without providing them with their entitlements, such promotions and logistical supply, it 
resulted in military intervention in 1973 that brought Juvenal Habyarimana into power. 
Since then the Hutu exclusively dominated the political, economic as well as the military 
aspects of the government.78 Thus, this ethnically homogenous military not only 
protected the Hutu government, but also formed a tool to plan and execute periodic 
killings of the Tutsi over the next thirty years such as in 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
and the 1994 genocide.79    
Thus, in order to preserve Hutu interests, the first and the second regimes of post-
colonial Rwanda intentionally nurtured an ethnically oriented and unprofessional Hutu 
military whose major focus was domestic order and repression of 15% of the population. 
B. FACTORS FOR UNPROFESSIONAL MILITARY IN RWANDA AND ITS 
IMPACT ON ETHNIC VIOLENCE: 1959-1994 
The post-colonial regime in Africa inherited the colonial military posture.  The 
colonial militaries were characterized by ethnic recruitment, domestic deployment, and 
lack of urgency.80 American political scientist Herbert M. Howe argues that during the 
colonial era, African militaries were used to further colonial interests, and their duties 
were to suppress domestic unrest in Africa.81 African militaries also effectively aided 
colonial rule in extracting resources from different regions of their states. Thus, for the 
colonial administration, the military was only valued as a tool of political dominance and 
was oriented inward, rather than towards outward aggression. In particular, the Rwandan  
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military was recruited on both ethnic and regional bases. This indicates that such a 
military served the interests of the Hutu population and specifically the Hutu from 
Bushiru region.82 
In Rwanda, the mission of the colonial military, which was focused on ensuring 
domestic order, was laying the basis for future unprofessional military. In independent 
Rwanda, former colonial governments’ maintained indirect control of the political system 
and the military, and dominated the extraction of resources.83 Therefore, factors such as 
ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, and formation of militia forces are some 
of the reasons that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda. 
In addition ethnic recruitment facilitates domestic deployment of armed forces 
against other ethnic groups. In Rwanda former military were recruited from the Hutu 
population and were used to coerce the perceived opposition groups in the country, most 
notably the Tutsi.84   
Furthermore, post-colonial Rwandan regimes lacked military training and 
professionalism. In particular, previous regimes in Rwanda relied on a guarantee of 
external protection from Belgium. Later on, this protection was provided by France. On 
the other hand the military posture in the post-colonial era was formed to suppress the 
ethnic groups, particularly the Tutsi. In this case they did not concentrate on acquiring 
combat efficiency and effectiveness since their perceived enemy was the Tutsi and less 
sophisticated. This in part explains the lack military professionalism. The lack of 
professional military ethics and values facilitated the carrying out of atrocities against its 
own people rather than serving them. This translated into the 1994 genocide.     
Alongside this process of de-professionalization, the Hutu regime, especially 
during the second republic, created parallel forces to act as counterweight to the rest of 
the military. Herbert M. Howe states that in the 1990s, Rwandan rulers relied on militia 
forces such as interahamwe and presidential guards, rather than relying on less 
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trustworthy national military. The reason was that the government did not trust the officer 
corps of the military even though it was a Hutu dominated armed forces.85 For example, 
the presidential guards were recruited from the president’s home area and formed the 
government death squads. The presidential guards initiated the killings of the Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu in Kigali to include the Prime Minister, Agath Uwilingiyimana. During 
the period immediately following the 1990 conflict in Rwanda, the government formed a 
more trusted and loyal militia group: the interahamwe militia. Although these tactics 
helped to preserve the Hutu government for thirty years, it also led to the planning, 
preparing, and executing of the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 
The Rwandan military played a large role in the propagation of ethnic hatred, 
planning and execution of the 1994 genocide. In the spread of hatred, the military owned 
and influenced the media. During the preparatory phase of genocide, the military trained 
and organized killers, and also distributed weapons to militia. During the execution 
phase, the military participated directly by killing Tutsi, by raping and humiliating Tutsi 
women, pillaging, and directing and supervising the militia and civilians in the killing of 
men, women and children. 
1. The Military and Propagation of Ethnic Hatred 
The military played a significant role in the propagation of ethnic hatred in 
Rwanda from 1973 to 1994. This period may be termed an incubation phase of the 
genocide. Indeed, prior to the genocide, the military was the legitimate and widely 
accepted source of information not only to the Hutu masses, but also to Hutu elites as 
well.  
The military influenced the media, among other things, to significantly entrench 
ethnic hatred in Rwandan society. For instance, some top, influential military officers 
owned a newspaper known as “Kangura.” According to human rights watch, “Kangura 
was a news paper jointly owned by the state and former Rwanda strongman 
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Habyarimana’s aides like Col. Serubuga and the late Col. Sagatwa.”86 American political 
scientist Peter Uvin argues that Kangura was a radical newspaper which exerted a more 
profound impact on ethnic division and hatred in Rwandan society than any other media 
or newspaper in Rwanda. Kangura frequently published ethnic related articles, such as 
periodic reviews of the typology of Rwandan society, origins of the different ethnic 
groups, and promoted the dehumanization of the Tutsi.87 
 After the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an attack on the Rwandan 
government in 1990, however, the newspaper shifted its strategy to include inflammatory 
news that radicalized the Hutu population more than ever before. For example, in 
December 1990 Kangura published an article titled the “ten Hutu commandments” that 
directly impacted the ruthless killings of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in the 1994 
genocide to include Hutu siblings who had Tutsi resemblance. The ten Hutu 
commandments were direct and simple for any one to interpret:  
1. The Rwandese armed forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the 
October war has taught us a lesson. No military personnel should marry a Tutsi. 
2. All strategic posts, be political, administrative, economic, military and security 
must be entrusted to Hutu. 
3. Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is 
to enhance the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result we shall consider a 
traitor any Hutu who forms alliance with the Tutsi in business, invests his money 
or the government’s money in a Tutsi enterprise, lends or borrows money from a 
Tutsi, or gives favors to a Tutsi in business like obtaining import licenses, bank 
loans, construction plots, and public markets.  
4. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the 
interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result we shall consider a traitor any Hutu 
who marries a Tutsi woman, makes a Tutsi woman his concubine, employs a 
Tutsi woman as secretary or makes her his dependant. 
5. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and 
conscientious in their role of woman, spouses and family mothers. Are they not 
beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
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6. Hutu woman be vigilant and try to be bring your husbands, brothers and sons 
back to reason. 
7. The education sector (pupils, students, and teachers) must be majority Hutu. 
8. The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi. 
9. The Hutu wherever you are must have unity, solidarity and be pre-occupied by the 
fate of their Hutu brothers. The Hutu both inside and outside Rwanda must 
constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with our Hutu 
brothers; they must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be 
firm and vigilant against their common enemy who are Tutsi. 
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be 
taught to every Hutu and at all levels. Every Hutu must spread this ideology.88 
These commandments made a significant impact on the ethnic hatred and on the 
subsequent genocide of the Tutsi.  Since the newspaper belonged to the military, that in 
part determined the credibility of the source of information to the population. Thus, the 
ethnic hatred directed and propagated by the military had a devastating impact on the 
civil war.  
Top military officials also controlled, directly or indirectly, an inflammatory 
Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). This radio station called for the 
solidarity of the Hutu and encouraged killing of the Tutsi.89 To make sure that the RTLM 
news reached every Hutu, the government distributed free radios. Llezlie L. Green argues 
that in the period of 1990-1994 about 87.7% of Rwandan household had radios and that 
this percentage became higher during the genocide.90 In addition the BBC estimates that 
the media saturation of radios in sub-Saharan Africa in 1992 was 13.5 per one hundred 
persons, while in Rwanda it was estimated to 25 per one hundred persons. Furthermore 
the United States Information Agency (USIA) reports that RTLM broadcasts of four a 
day in Kinyarwanda and French were relayed to other part of the country through a 
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network of transmitters owned by the government.91 This greatly radicalized the Hutu 
masses and incited them to kill their neighbor and countrymen. These were strategic 
assets owned and protected directly or indirectly by the military.  
2. The Role of the Military in Organizing the 1994 Genocide 
In terms of concrete preparations, the military trained, organized and provided 
logistical support to the interahamwe militia. The military distributed weapons in 
preparation for genocide in a program disguised as self defense. Des Forges states that 
soldiers distributed firearms to militia and other supporters of president Habyarimana in 
1993 and early 1994. Col. Theoneste Bagosora, however, advocated equipping the young 
men with local weapons such as machetes, spears and clubs. It is believed that these local 
weapons killed more people than firearms.92   
Col. Bagosora played a significant role in the preparation period by supplying 
small arms and hand grenades to civilians and creating an extremist military group 
known as “AMASASU.” Literally amasasu means bullets, but in this case, AMASASU 
meant “the Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the Age-old Deceitful Acts of the Unarists.” 
Unarist refers to a political party that was dominated by Tutsi before the 1959 Hutu 
revolution. Amasasu was a group of hardline soldiers who were determined to 
exterminate the Tutsi. This group feared nobody, and according to Human Rights Watch 
they issued tracts and threats to president Habyarimana warning him of the impending 
task of killing the Tutsi and to stop attempts to build an inclusive government as was 
provided for in the 1993 Arusha accords.93  Consequently, the intention of this group of 
soldiers was to exterminate anybody who sought a peaceful resolution to the Rwandan 
conflict. This may help explain the subsequent death of president Habyarimana in April, 
1994.   
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3. Execution 
Finally, the military fully participated in the massacre of the Tutsi in the 1994 
genocide. Des Forge reports that “soldiers, whether on active duty or retired, killed 
civilians, gave permission, set example, and commanded others to kill.”94 The report 
further argues that the participation of the military throughout the entire genocide 
indicates that the most powerful authorities at the national level ordered or approved their 
role in the slaughter.”95 This report, however, obscures the role of the military indicated 
in the planning process at the national level. Yet, the military had the final say in the 
decision making process not only after the president’s death but in the incubation and 
preparation phases of the genocide. In other words, the military greatly determined the 
political course of the nation. For instance, there were senior military actors that were 
involved in the genocide and influenced the decisions in the political system of the 
government: General Bizimugu, the minister of defense; Col. Tharcisse Renzaho; 
Lieutenant Colonels Leonard Nkundiye and Anatole Nsengiyumva. Also military leaders 
like Maj. Protais Mpiranyi, Capt. Gaspard Hategekimana and Maj. Bernard Ntuyahaga of 
the elite units of the presidential guards and Para commandos decisively participated in 
the genocide.96 
Furthermore, shortly after president Habyarimana’s death, the military took 
charge of all aspects of security and directly or indirectly influenced political decisions. 
For instance, on different occasions military personnel chaired the provisional meetings 
in the presence of the Prefect (the leader of the province). For example Col. Simba took 
the chair of provisional meeting away from the Prefect of Gikongoro prefecture and 
authorized the attack on the Tutsi.97 
Lastly, the military was involved in several tasks, that is, they were involved in 
planning, preparing and executing genocide. In particular, they killed Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu and organized and commanded the Hutu militia and civilians to kill, rape Tutsi 
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women, and pillage. As Green puts it, “the military and militia raped Tutsi women and 
girls, forced them into sexual slavery and mutilated them.”98 These barbaric acts 
constituted the bulk of the military operations at the time, rather than engaging the RPF 
guerrilla forces on the battlefield. Partly this determined ex-FAR’s defeat on one hand, on 
the other it may help to explain why ex-FAR was successful in killing one million people 
in one hundred days.  
The military’s strategy of killing all Tutsi and humiliating their women and 
children was intended to serve a dual purpose. First, the strategy was intended to deprive 
the RPF of support, thus, seeking a military victory against the RPF in due course. 
Second, they wanted to realize their long due dreams of wiping the Tutsi off the face of 
the Earth. In these ways, the former Hutu military played a significant role in the 
propagation of ethnic hatred, planning and conducting of genocide, more so than any 
other institution of the former Rwandan government. Therefore, this reveals the effect of 
an ethnically homogenous military before and during the conflict in Rwanda, but also has 
a direct impact on post-conflict DDR in particular, as well as subsequent stability and 
reconciliation in general.  
D. CONCLUSION 
It would seem naïve to state that people [Hutu and Tutsi] have been killing each 
other in Rwanda since the 1959 Hutu revolution, including the horrific genocide of 1994. 
Also, it would be unfair to claim that all Hutu killed Tutsi, since Hutu moderates were 
also victims of the 1994 genocides and some Hutu saved Tutsi during the genocide as 
well. Also the claim would not recognize those Hutu who pressured the government for 
change between 1992 and 1994, as well as those who participated in stopping the 
genocide. It is imperative, however, to appreciate the fact that some top military officials 
and few Hutu civilian elites, driven by greed, dragged the majority of the Hutu masses 
into systematic massacres of the Tutsi in the horrific genocide of 1994. 
This chapter noted periodic killings of the Tutsi to include the genocide. 
However, the available literature neither offers satisfactory explanations for the collective 
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punishment of the Tutsi since 1959 nor a shared guilt on the part of the Hutu population 
for atrocities committed in the genocide. The literature as earlier seen in the chapter, 
however, acknowledges the responsibility of the Hutu masses led by Hutu elites and the 
military in the killing of more than one million Tutsi in the 1994 genocide. In this case, 
the military was an indispensable and responsible element of the cumulative atrocities 
committed against the Tutsi since 1959, including the 1994 genocide. This, in part may 
help to explain why reconciliation that starts in the military – integration and 
reintegration of ex-combatants – makes it possible for the rest of the society to reconcile 
in post-conflict Rwanda, in particular, and in other post-conflict cases, in general. Thus, 
reconciliation in the military directly resonates in civilian behavior, making it possible to 
attain societal reconciliation, in particular, and stability, in general. 
In sum, the chapter discussed the role of the military and ethnic violence in pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed the origin of ethnic 
groups in Rwanda; it pointed out that ethnicity and ethnic identity were stereotyped and 
given to Rwandans by early explorers and missionaries and entrenched by colonialists. 
Also the chapter analyzed factors that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda 
between 1959 and 1994: ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, domestic 
deployment, lack of urgency, and creation of parallel forces. Lastly, the chapter assessed 
the role of an ethnically homogenous military in the series of massacres of the Tutsi, 
including the 1994 genocide, as well as its negative impact on post-conflict DDRI in 
Rwanda.   
The next chapter will discuss DDRI in Rwanda. It will also emphasize the role of 
ingando in the Rwandan model of DDRI as an indispensable phase before military 
integration and reintegration of ex-combatants. It is also a factor that enhances stability 
and societal reconciliation. Also it will demonstrate that it is possible to change a 
stereotyped enemy image by applying affirmative actions, such as integrating former ex-
combatants into the national defense forces, reintegration of ex-combatants into the 
national economic and social structures, building an inclusive government, and 
embracing reconciliation in all state structures.   
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IV. POST-CONFLICT RWANDA: DILEMMA OF PUNISHMENT 
VERSUS SOCIETAL RECONCILIATION 
[E]thnicization of the military has not slackened in many countries and 
will likely continue as long as…countries continue to have personalized 
political rule as the foundation of their officer corps.99 
          
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Chapter III discussed the role of military and ethnic violence in pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed factors that led to an 
unprofessional military in post-colonial Rwanda and its impact on ethnic violence. 
Lastly, the chapter analyzed the role of an ethnically homogenous military in the 1994 
genocide and its negative impacts on post-conflict DDR in Rwanda. 
 Chapter IV will discuss the impact of ingando, integration of ex-combatants into 
the national military, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society on the 
societal reconciliation using the case of post-1994 Rwanda. Ingando is a sensitization 
mechanism for ex-combatants that deconstructs the enemy image, promotes change in 
behavior, and analyzes the basis of ethnic prejudice before ex-combatants are either 
integrated into the military or reintegrated into civilian society. This is done through 
intensive educational programs on social, political, and economic aspects of government 
and society. Military integration refers to a tangible affirmative action that eliminates fear 
and builds trust and confidence between ex-combatants and their fellow ethnic groups. 
Reintegration acts as an agent of value transfer, and facilitates interaction because ex-
combatants view themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi – thus enhancing 
reconciliation.  
 The ingando model had to integrate a former rebel army now turned government 
force, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), and the army of the former government of 
Rwanda, the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR). At the beginning of the war in 
1990, the RPA was dominated by descendants of the Tutsi who fled the country in 1959. 
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Recruitment, however, was open to all ethnic groups in Rwanda, unlike the ex-FAR 
which was an exclusively Hutu military. The war raged between the ex-FAR and RPA 
for four years culminating in the 1994 genocide, where the ex-FAR and the Hutu masses 
exterminated one million Tutsi. The RPA brought that war and the genocide to an end in 
July 1994 when it forced the Hutu government to flee Rwanda. The RPA became the 
Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) in 2003 after integrating with the ex-FAR. Those not 
integrated into the new military force had to be reintegrated into society – a large task. 
 The origins of the RPA lie in Uganda: most of the Tutsis in the RPA had acquired 
their military skills by serving in the Ugandan military in the 1980s. The RPA was 
dominated by descendants of Tutsi exiled in 1959, who had been denied repatriation ever 
since. The previous Rwandan regime had consistently requested that neighboring 
countries naturalize them, refusing their claims to Rwandese citizenship. Perceiving that 
a military option was the only remaining means of bringing them back home, the exiled 
Tutsis in Uganda joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrilla forces and aided 
Yoweri Museveni into power. In 1990, the Rwandese elements of the NRA split off to 
form the RPA and the RPF, and invaded Rwanda from the north. The ensuing civil war 
triggered the genocide of 1994. 
 In the aftermath of the civil war and genocide, three major challenges faced the 
government of national unity: 1) to defeat an insurgency rooted in ethnic ideology and 
restore security to the region; 2) re-build and unite Rwandan society; and 3) foster 
sustainability in political, social and economic development. One way to ensure 
reconciliation and stability was through military integration/reintegration. Rwanda 
initiated the “ingando model” of sensitization, which ex-combatants go through before 
integration into the military or reintegration into the civilian society.   
B. INGANDO MODEL OF SOCIETAL SENSITIZATION AND CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION 
After the civil war, Rwandans returned home from refugee sanctuaries in 
neighboring countries. Waves of refugees had fled Rwanda during the crises of 1959, 
1962, 1973, and 1994. At the same time, the new government also had to deal with 
internally displaced people. These groups of people had different political ideologies, 
backgrounds, doctrines, emotions, and suspicions, and had adopted cultures from 
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different nations. Also, the situation was characterized by fear and hate since among them 
was victims and perpetrators of genocide, including defeated ex-combatants. To address 
such a dilemma the national unity government introduced two rather effective cultural 
institutions: Gacaca and ingando. Gacaca is a traditional restorative justice system; it has 
constitutional powers and is linked to the Supreme Court, but is independent in action. 
Ingando, on the other hand, was instituted to reconcile groups of people by minimizing 
their differences.  
 In kinyarwanda, ingando refers to a convenient place where Rwandans used to 
retreat in order to discuss issues concerning national interests and strategies as well as 
emergencies such as a disaster, a natural catastrophe, or territorial expansion. Ingando 
offers a mechanism to analyze the causes of their past failures and find new strategies. 
Ingando comes from a kinyarwanda word, kugandika, which means a temporal halt to 
one’s daily activities and the devotion of a certain amount of time – weeks or months – to 
addressing issues of greater concern facing the nation and the society in particular. 
Fatuma Ndangiza, the executive secretary of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) regards ingando as men’s retreat.100 
The main purpose of ingando is to create a peaceful forum to address social, 
political, and economic issues as well as ethnic division facing Rwandans today, for both 
military and civilian society. Furthermore, after having completed the ingando program, 
participants should be able to effectively practice and disseminate the values and tenets of 
unity and reconciliation. Consequently, ingando is meant for all Rwandans regardless of 
their social, economic and political status. Fatuma Ndangiza, the executive secretary of 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) states that, “indeed 
gradually ingando eroded away suspicion and checked hatred as participants had to eat, 
sleep, and work together in ingando.”101 Thus, such an intensive sensitization program is 
an indispensable element of reconciliation in societies torn apart by ethnic violent 
conflicts and civil war in general.   
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 ingando may be seen as a catalyst for reconciliation despite earlier criticisms from 
scholars and genocidal forces. Harvard University researcher Chi Mgbako views ingando 
in contrasting and controversial ways. On the one hand, he argues that ingando camps 
were employed by RPF to plant the seed of reconciliation while, at same time, 
disseminating RPF political ideology as well as political indoctrination of participants. 
On the other hand Mgbako argues that an “ingando-like program that is free of pro-RPF 
spin and governmental bias, and that inspires an open and honest dialogue about history 
should be integrated into formal and informal school curricula.”102 
This chapter argues that ingando is a rehabilitation and reconciliation tool 
intended to accomplish several things: transform negative perceptions that cause ethnic 
hatred; mitigate conflict influence factors such as fear and exclusion; manage defeat, 
shame, and remorse for those who committed atrocities; and erase myths and erroneous 
theories of ethnic differences of the type discussed in Chapter III. Furthermore it 
eliminates fear and illusive perception, and consequently restores hope, instills 
confidence and creates a more responsible and patriotic citizen. The ingando curriculum 
in Table 1 is a benchmark for this assertion. 
 
Table 1.   Lessons and Other Activities Done in ingando: Mutobo Demobilization 
Center 
 
S/No Lessons and Activities Presenters 
1 DDR Program RDRC 
2 The role of Justice, rule of law & responsibility of national 
police  
National Police 
3 Security in Rwanda, causes and consequences, conflict in Great 
Lakes region, culture of patriotism, & refugee crisis and 
consequences 
Ministry of Defense 
4 Justice as a factor for stability and development, laws in 
Rwanda and new constitutional law 
Ministry of Justice 
5 The history of Rwanda in pre- and post-colonial rule Ombudsman’s office 
6 Measures of fighting corruption and nepotism Auditor General 
7 Good governance and decentralization & the role of CDC 
development 
Ministry of local 
government 
8 Citizenship and Human Rights; International law on 
segregation & genocide 
Human Rights 
Commission 
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9 Genocide Ideology Member of Parliament 
10 Resettlement, land, & environment protection Ministry of Finance 
11 Poverty reduction strategy, root cause of genocide, & role of 
tolerance in post-conflict 
Senate 
12 The role of women in development HUGURA Association 
13 Unity and reconciliation  National Unity & 
Reconciliation 
Commission  
14 Investment & Tourism in Rwanda Investment & Export 
Office 
15 Associations & economic development; Natural resources & 
economic development; and Small industries & microfinance 
project 
Ministry of Commerce 
16 Government policy on vocational training Ministry of Public 
Service 
17 NEPAD & Regional integration NEPAD advisor: 
President’s office 
18 Rwanda revenue authority: Policy & achievements Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA) 
19 Gacaca Judicial System Gacaca courts 
20 The role of religion in conflict resolution & the role of religious 
dominations in development 
Eglise Episcopale au 
Rwanda (EER)-
Church of Rwanda 
21 Trauma symptoms and how they can be mitigated Psycho-social 
consultation service 
22 HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment & counseling of HIV/AIDS 
victims 
Commission National 
de Lutte Control 
(CNLS) 
23 Agriculture and animal husbandry Ministryof Agriculture 
& Livestock 
24 The role of youth and culture in national building & 
development 
Ministry of Youth, 
Sport & Culture 
25 The role of international community in Rwandan conflict Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
26 Government’s policy on education 
 
Ministry of Education 




28 Malaria prevention, hygiene, medical screening  Ministry of Health 
29 Functions of Banks Credit & Saving 
Scheme (CSS) 
30 ID photos, closing ceremony, Issue certificates completion, & 
Issue of reinsertion funds and Basic Needs Kit 
RDRC 
 




General Seraphin Bizimungu, the former chief of staff who had commanded the 
1996-7 ex-FAR incursions into Rwanda from the DRC, confided to the author during an 
interview that his opinions before he joined ingando in December 2005 were slightly 
different from Chi Mgbako’s and yet, more radical in substance. He stated that before 
joining ingando, “I viewed ingando not only as RPF’s way of political indoctrination, but 
also a means of changing people’s psychological equilibrium through a series of 
indoctrinations and eventually brainwashes the mind.” Three months later, he had quite 
another perception: “I found it quite different from what I thought; in any case I didn’t 
expect such good treatment, and socio-economic and political orientation from Rwandan 
government. I have all the rights as any Rwandan now; I have confidence, and hope for 
the future unlike the miserable life I was leading in Congo forests. From here I will join 
the national military.”103 Consequently, this testimony may assist in assessing the impact 
of ingando in transforming ex-combatants’ way of thinking into a more hopeful one. 
The ingando curriculum in Table 1 reflects the quality of lessons, calculated not 
only to register the expected behavioral change, but also to impart the knowledge and 
skills to equip ex-combatants to lead a normal life. Among other things, during ingando 
ex-combatants discuss the history of Rwandan society; the origin of ethnic division in 
Rwanda; unity and reconciliation issues to include Gacaca courts, social, economic and 
political aspects of the government; and the rule of law.  
In this case, ingando may be regarded as a remarkable psychological 
breakthrough for Rwandans in addressing legacies of past regimes, including one of the 
most horrific genocides of the century. Ingando comes before integration of ex-
combatants into national military force and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian 
life (see Figure 1). It is a prerequisite for the success of a DDR program in general and 
integration/reintegration of ex-combatants in particular. Thus, ingando may be viewed as 
a viable and indispensable tool for peace building, human rights observance and 
sustainable unity and reconciliation, as well as social and economic development.      
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 The government of Rwanda encourages citizens of different status to attend 
ingando: it is a prerequisite for any student joining an institution of higher learning in 
Rwanda, businessmen/women, politicians, church leaders, genocidaires, Gacaca judges, 
tax collectors, ex-RPA soldiers, and ex-combatants. These groups attend ingando for a 
duration ranging from two weeks to four months depending on the training needs for each 
group. The military is supposed to attend for three to four months. Because of the 
military’s actions during the genocide and since they still possessed the capacity to cause 
instability, members of the ex-FAR were the first target group to attend ingando. This 
was done on the assumption that transforming the thinking of the military would have a 
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C. MILITARY INTEGRATION AS A MODEL FOR SOCIETAL 
RECONCILIATION 
After ingando, ex-combatants are integrated into the ranks of the Rwanda Defense 
Forces (see Figure 1), and they enjoy all privileges involved. Also while in ingando, ex-
combatants dispel fear and build confidence; in this way, they integrate freely into the 
national force. Thus, ingando mechanism is a viable means of managing defeat, shame, 
and remorse on the part of the loser in post-conflict situations.   
 The international community has been involved in addressing nations’ security in 
a global context. In particular, DDR has been a tool of security sector reform (SSR) that 
is meant to transform violent conflicts into a stable situation in order to allow for social 
and economic development as well as political stability. Although these efforts have 
mitigated, to some extent, the effects of violent conflicts, through disarming, 
demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants into the civilian society, the opportunity to 
ensure sustainable stability in divided societies has not been fully exploited: societal 
reconciliation through integration of ex-combatants into the national military.  
1. Conceptualizing Military Integration in Conflict Transformation 
Post-conflict DDR is a main component of security sector reform (SSR). “SSR 
involves political, social, and economic elements of national power that are engaged in 
providing human security. It also involves transformation of security forces such as the 
military, police, and paramilitary, as well as militia and other non-state actors or spoilers, 
in order to effectively provide internal and external security for the populace.”104 The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) presents security sector 
reform as “the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, 
legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security 
for their citizens.”105  
In this case, security sector reform/transformation is an integral part of a wide 
spectrum of the international security system in general. In particular, it involves 
interoperability of national elements of power and interagency as well as post-conflict 
disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants into the 
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civilian society. This description of DDR, however, reflects a conventional way of 
addressing post-conflict security challenges. The conventional setting entails disbanding 
the defeated military force as occurred in Ethiopia in 1992 whereby 412,000 former 
government forces were demobilized.106 Similarly, former Iraq forces were disbanded 
following the defeat of Saddam Hussein, which contributed to the insurgency in Iraq.107 
Neither stability nor societal reconciliation was achieved in the two cases. Rather, 
instability and ethnic or religious division have been entrenched. Thus, the integration of 
ex-combatants into a national military is a factor that demands deviation from the 
conventional thinking and the ability to take some minimal risk in order to achieve 
stability and societal reconciliation.   
As for Lt. General Charles Kayonga, the Chief of Staff Land Forces of RDF, 
integrating ex-combatants into the new Rwandan military was a risky undertaking. 
However, Rwandan leaders had to make a trade off. He states that  
Indeed authorities considered the possibility of weakening the military as a 
result of integration of former ex-combatants and there were reasons 
behind such arguments. Firstly, the integrated force had been intoxicated 
over time with ideology of genocide and some had directly or indirectly 
participated in genocide. Secondly, the enemy forces in eastern DRC who 
had not surrendered to the government forces were poised to attack 
Rwanda and there were fears that the integrated force would be 
collaborators. Thirdly, the existence of popular support to genocidal forces 
immediately after genocide also raised concerns. Lastly, processes that 
were going on in the aftermath of genocide such as prosecutions and 
imprisonment of the suspects of genocide who were either relatives or at 
least had some connection with the integrated forces at first undermined 
RPF/A’s legitimacy in the civilian population and reconciliation efforts as 
well.108    
  Integrating the warring factions or defeated combatants into a single national 
military force is a risky undertaking. Yet, it offers an effective and indispensable strategy 
for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation if properly handled. The risks of not 
doing it may be even greater. 
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 A senior researcher on central Africa in the arms management program, Nelson 
Alusala, stated that, in 1997, the Rwandan government transformed its counterinsurgency 
strategy into a political and social effort that, within a year, broke the back of the 
insurgency. He argues that a key element in undermining the insurgency in northwest 
Rwanda was the integration of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) into the new 
Rwandan military. Insurgents were turned into soldiers; they were given new uniforms, a 
modest salary, and a stake in the country’s future.109   
2. The Military as a Mirror of the Society 
 Some have argued that the endless violent conflicts in many parts of the world, 
especially in Africa, are a result of the ethnicization of militaries worldwide.110 Thus, 
militaries have been seen as the protectors of certain ethnic groups and used in a series of 
atrocities committed against other ethnic groups, rather than protectors of the entire 
country. In this case there is no distinction between the military actions and the ethnic 
groups they represent. As a result, a recurring ethnic conflict syndrome is created.   
This in part helps to explain why an affirmative action focused on the military, 
such as integrating former enemy forces into the national military, may have a direct 
impact in stabilizing the civilian societies previously plagued by ethnic violence and 
might be able to interrupt the cycle of ethnic conflict and hatred. It is self explanatory that 
an inclusive military means that all ethnic groups of civilian society are represented. 
Therefore, from a moral point of view, an integrated military will not be used against its 
own people because they cannot be deployed to kill their parents and relatives. Rather 
such military induces links between different groups and consequently fosters societal 
reconciliation.  
General Kayonga states that military integration was conceived with the objective 
of attaining societal reconciliation and indeed authorities expected it to be successful. 
Moreover, he argues that 
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the ex-FAR was the major player in the atrocities committed in the 
country. On one hand there were RPA liberators who stopped genocide 
and on the other was the ex-FAR and interahamwe militia who directly or 
indirectly supported the genocide process. The continued confrontation of 
those groups, therefore, was bound to result in continued conflict. The 
leadership maintained moral high ground; they were convinced that a 
unified military would reflect the entire Rwandan society. Furthermore, 
the leadership knew that ex-combatants only had ideological bankruptcy 
of good citizenship and if given intensive training and integrate them into 
the national military there were reliable to change, which was the case. 
Consequently, this significantly impacted societal reconciliation.111  
The effect of military integration can also be analyzed on the basis of “law-
context communication/individualistic cultures” versus “high-context 
communication/collectivistic cultures.” Ting-Toomey argues that in law-context 
communication cultures people possess individualistic values, whereby an effect on an 
individual does not affect in any way his group members such as in Germany, United 
States, and Sweden. On the other hand, in high-context communication cultures people 
have group-orientated values. Therefore whatever happens to a member of a collectivistic 
culture directly affects his family and subsequently his ethnic group, such as in Middle-
east Arab and African countries.112 The goodwill and incentives given to ex-combatants, 
especially integrating them into the national military force and allowing them to have a 
stake in the national security, not only diffuses the violence or latent conflict, but it also 
deconstructs the enemy image in the civilian society and makes it possible for societal 
reconciliation. 
Therefore, unless elements of fear and personal security are addressed, 
reconciliation will not be possible and latent or violent conflict will smolder. The surest 
way to assure a divided society of their safety is to make sure that their ethnicity or 
religion is represented in the military, since militaries in underdeveloped and developing 
nations have been used as instruments of terror in their own societies. Thus, a  
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representation of different ethnic groups in the military should eliminate fear and ensure 
personal security but also restore social harmony, and turn the culture of hate into a 
culture of hope and peace. 
Integrating ex-combatants into the national force, however, does not guarantee 
stability. Such post-conflict situations require the political and military leadership to 
constantly monitor the situation and avoid divisions within the military. Military training, 
professionalism, and a focused curriculum in military schools that incorporate 
reconciliation values, will help suppress hatred in the military, since military personnel 
will be preoccupied with career development. General Kayonga states that ex-combatants 
were put in military professionalism programs and re-educated on the political history of 
Rwanda in ingando and the correct role of the military. That is why integration of ex-
combatants did not affect military professionalism in the Rwanda Defense Forces.113 
3. Military Integration as a Trust Builder   
 Ideally, the military comes from the civilian population and is supposed to serve 
the entire society. Therefore, it forms an integral part of the society. The peculiar aspect 
of the military, unlike other government institutions or professionals, is that it possesses a 
legitimate monopoly over weapons and has a unique characteristic of managing violence. 
However, this legitimacy has been abused and the military has been used by state actors 
in atrocities against part of its own population, as discussed in the previous chapter. This 
occurred not only in Rwanda, but in Uganda and other countries as well. For example 
during Milton Obote’s rule in Uganda during the 1960s, Obote promoted military officers 
from his home area: Acholi and Langi. After Amin’s military intervention in 1971, Amin 
hunted down and killed many Acholi military officers and politicians, and marginalized 
the rest. Subsequently, Amin recruited and promoted groups from the West Nile: the 
Kakwa, Lugbara, and Madi. When Obote came back to power after the 1979 Liberation 
War, he retaliated against Amin’s people.114 In this case, it was a collective punishment 
of the entire ethnic group to include their members in the military. 
                                                 
113 Ting-Toomy, 100-280. 
114 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, (United States of 
America: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2001), 40.   
 60 
When militaries have been ethnified and used as political pawns in such a manner, 
integrating ex-combatants into the ranks of the national military could break this cycle of 
revenge and collective punishment. If this integration is undertaken as a goodwill gesture 
driven by a sense of moral obligation on the part of the victor, and done without 
anticipation of reciprocity from the loser, the involuntary reciprocation that comes as a 
result of an affirmative action could yield sustainable and long lasting psychological 
change. As a result, this effect will resonate directly in their dependents, families, and 
relatives. Consequently, the entire society will change.  
Partly this may assist in explaining how Rwanda managed to defeat the 
insurgency that originated in the eastern DRC forests and affected the northwestern part 
of Rwanda in 1998 and subsequently end the influx of Rwandan refugees that had 
plagued the entire region between 1994 and 2000. Integrating former Hutu combatants 
dispelled fears in the Hutu population initial confidence that encouraged the voluntary 
return of large number of refugees from neighboring countries in less than ten years. 
In Rwanda, however, building trust is a two-part process for the victors: trust was 
built on the correct understanding of the political situation underlying events and the 
process that led to the division of Rwandan society and the genocide, such as the colonial 
legacy. General Kayonga argues that initial trust for inclusion in post-conflict Rwanda 
also emanated from the past experience where RPA would integrate captured enemy 
forces into its military. Those captured enemy forces would immediately shift 
allegiance.115    
An important step in the reconciliation process occurred in November 2003, when 
General Paul Rwarakabije, the former overall commander of the rebel movement, the 
Force Démocratic Pour Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), and many others voluntarily 
returned to the country from the Congo forest.116 These were the very people who 
encouraged the remaining rebels in DRC to return home. On 15 December 2005, General 
Seraphin Bizimungu, the rebel leader who succeeded General Rwarakabije, voluntarily 
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returned home with 81 soldiers and 70 civilians from their bases in eastern DRC.117 This 
strategy of integrating ex-combatants into the national military broke the enemy’s will to 
fight, and the remaining group of insurgents was willing to surrender to the Rwandan 
government. The act of voluntary repatriation and integration of ex-combatants has 
remarkably improved the security along the DRC – Rwanda border in the last five years. 
Also the successful integration of ex-combatants into the military has encouraged 
integration in civilian society. For instance, it has encouraged a great number of refugees 
to return home voluntarily. According to UNHCR, Rwanda has the lowest number of 
refugees when compared to Angola, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, or 
Sudan. The UNHCR also reports that out of the remaining 48,000 Rwandan refugees, the 
voluntary repatriation rate is between 1000 and 2000 people per month.118   
The amalgamation of warring factions has created a well-disciplined and combat 
effective military in Rwanda, the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF). Due to its military 
professionalism, the RDF has gained a good reputation on the international scene. 
Although the integration of ex-combatants into a unified military force was an important 
factor in the success of this strategy, the United Nations, African Union (AU), Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs), and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) still 
neglect military integration in post-conflict situations. Despite achievements registered by 
military integration in Rwanda, this program has not been fully integrated in the formal 
DDR program, nor is it supported by practitioners in peace-building. Nevertheless 
military integration relies on government initiative and support to foster reconciliation. 
Yet, this thesis has argued for and shown the importance of military integration in post-
conflict stability and societal reconciliation. It further argues that if practitioners in 
conflict resolution would effectively integrate and equally support military integration as 
part of security sector transformation in general, and in DDR program in particular, this 
may assist in attaining societal reconciliation and could break the vicious cycle of ethnic 
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violence. This will not only ensure stability and reconciliation, but also enhance healthy 
civil-military relations and military professionalism as well. 
Post-conflict situations following violent conflicts present windows of 
opportunity to reconcile the society; however, they are rarely exploited by parties to the 
conflict, partly because greed surpasses perceived or actual grievances. Thus, the cycle of 
conflict begins anew. In other cases where those windows of opportunity have been 
seized, such as the case of Rwanda, there was an element of risk taking at the expense of 
societal reconciliation. It required a strong and charismatic leader, President Paul 
Kagame, to convince victors and losers to accept change. In addition, integrating former 
enemy forces is a function of strong leadership with strong vision. The RPF/A leadership 
believed that their cause and war was just. Having analyzed the positive impact of 
military integration on societal reconciliation, the leadership had to explain it to people119 
because some Tutsi, as well as moderate Hutu, were opposed to this integration.    
Nevertheless, this undertaking demands patience, consistence, and that the entire 
society stays the course, as reconciliation is a process that takes a long time to yield 
tangible results. The configuration of the military forces significantly affects interaction 
within different groups of the society. The more coherent and professional the military is, 
the more likelihood that societal reconciliation will succeed and the region will 
subsequently stabilize. 
D. REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS AND SOCIETAL 
RECONCILIATION  
 This chapter discussed in detail the role of ingando in the sensitization of ex-
combatants and the impact it has on behavioral change, the lessening of social tension, 
and deconstruction of the enemy image. In addition the previous section discussed the 
interrelationship between the sensitization of ex-combatants and integration of ex-
combatants into a national military and the subsequent effects on societal reconciliation. 
However, military integration alone may not guarantee a sustainable impact on societal 
reconciliation. Therefore, this demands direct interaction of ex-combatants, that is, a 
mixture of those warring factions into the civilian society. Thus, the DDR program 
reintegrates ex-combatants into the civilian society as well as into the military.  
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The Rwandan DDR is part of the overall Arusha peace accord that was signed in 
Tanzania in 1993. The Arusha peace accord was adjusted to suit the situation after 
genocide as some members of former government forces had committed genocide. The 
protocol was based on the assumption that a negotiated peace agreement was possible 
between the Habyarimana government and RPF. Even though the protocol involved 
inclusion of members of RPA/RPF, it neither provided for support of ex-combatants to 
effectively transition into civilian society, nor did it provide for reconciliation in ingando 
as a prerequisite for an effective DDR program.120 To better understand the links 
between DDR and the civilian society in Rwanda, the chapter discusses the Rwanda 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP). 
1. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)  
Rwanda created a two-way holistic program that equally reintegrates the defeated 
enemy combatants and victorious forces into the civilian society as well as integrating 
within ranks the former enemy forces into the national military as shown in Figure 2. 
Although DDR in Rwanda is a twin program that incorporates military integration and 
reintegration of ex-combatants into society, the bulk of the program lies with the latter. 
The reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society is conducted after a 
thorough sensitization program in the ingando solidarity camps. After ingando, selected 
members of the ex-combatants are ready to integrate freely into the society and the 
national economic system, as well.    
Furthermore, the Rwandan DDR is neither a consent-based approach, where the 
negotiated agreement is reached between parties to the conflict and no clear victor to the 
conflict is registered, nor a coercive-based approach where a third party, usually the UN, 
forces the parties to the conflict to disarm, demobilize and reintegrates them into the 
civilian society as was the case of Liberia between December 2003 and November 
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2004.121 Rather the RDRP is deliberate, yet conciliatory, and aimed at achieving stability 
and societal reconciliation. To achieve these goals, RDRP has set objectives:  
- to demobilize ex-combatants, that is, RPA, armed groups (insurgents from Congo 
forests), and ex-FAR, and support their transition to civilian life; 
- to support social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants who remain socio-
economically vulnerable; 
- to facilitate the reallocation of the government expenditure from defense spending to 
social and economic programs; 
- to enhance social capital which is an indispensable factor for societies to interact 
and consequently facilitates societal reconciliation.122 
2. Actors and Finance 
 The DDR project in Rwanda is owned by the indigenous people, whereas external 
actors, such as World Bank and other donors take part in assessment, financial support, 
and evaluation of the project. Initially the project was financed by the Rwandan 
government, but later the Bank and other donors decided to finance the project under a 
multinational demobilization and reintegration program, through International 
Development Association (IDA) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) (see Table 2). 
These funds are distributed in different component parts of RDRP, (see Table 3).123 
 
Table 2.   Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Finance Plan 
Source Amount (Million US $) Percent 
Government of Rwanda 2.7 5 
IDA 25.0 47 
Bilateral 26.6 48 
Total 53.3 100 
Source: RDRC Office in Kigali 
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Table 3.   Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Costs (Stage II). 
Component Unit Cost (US $) Total Program Cost 
(million US$) 
Percent 
Demobilization 78 3.3 6 
Reinsertion 299 17.2 32 
Reintegration 338 18.4 34 
Special group 759 5.6 11 
Technical Assistance 35 2.3 4 
Program Management 60 4.0 7 
Contingencies  38 2.5 5 
Total Estimate 800 53.3 100 
Source: RDRC Office in Kigali 
 
 The government of Rwanda contributed US $2.7 million in the second phase of 
DDR, whereas its contribution in the first phase was US $9.8 million. Furthermore, it 
pays all taxes involved in works, goods and services to the program.124 This indigenous 
ownership may help to explain, in part, the success of the DDR program in Rwanda. The 
amount collected for RDRP funding in stage II exceeded the estimated amount. The 
program had estimated US $ 25 million but donors contributed US 53.3 million as shown 
in Table 3. Donors were motivated by a viable and effective project as well as the 
political will on the part of the government. In fact, the international community was so 
interested in the Rwandan model of DDR that they decided to increase their funding to 
the program, allowed the government to increase the scope of stage II of the RDDR and 
exceeded the original budget estimates.125 In this way, the World Bank and other donors 
are hoping to establish the Rwandan program as a model for the rest of the countries in 
the Great Lake region undergoing DDR and security sector reform. 
 These funds helped to properly reinsert ex-combatants into civilian life, and have 
enabled them to establish their own economic projects. The financial and technical 
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assistance for projects of ex-combatants, coupled with the corporate nature of the military 
of viewing themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu and Tutsi, in part has created an 
environment of interaction between the Hutu and Tutsi in their communities. Thus, those 
attributes have considerably enhanced societal reconciliation.  
3. The Success and Impact of DDR Program in Rwanda 
In general the success of DDR program in Rwanda can be analyzed in terms of 
the levels of social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into the community, and 
in terms of security, as well. The social reintegration and economic reintegration are 
complementary aspects that determine the success of DDR in post-conflict situations. 
Social reintegration facilitates smooth reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their 
communities. It contributes to social cohesion and social networks as well as social 
interactions. These form part of the basic requirements for societal reconciliation. 
Economic reintegration supports and promotes productive self-employment projects. In 
addition it addresses issues related to social and psychological integration needs, thus, 
facilitating financial independence on the part of ex-combatants. As for security, it is a 
fundamental pillar for post-conflict reconstruction and a prerequisite for social and 
economic reintegration.126 Furthermore, successful reintegration of ex-combatants into 
the society entails that ex-combatants live without fear, or unbearable psychological 
stress.127 Therefore, a combination of social and economic reintegration not only 
facilitates social cohesion, networks and interaction as well as individual financial 
independence, but rather it has remarkably enhanced stability and societal reconciliation 
particularly in Rwanda.  
The RDRP has demobilized and reintegrated a total of 55,582 ex-combatants into 
the civilian society (see Table 5). Upon discharge from ingando ex-combatants are 
allocated a basic needs kit (BNK) equivalent to FRW 50,000, and recognition of service 
allowance ranging from FRW 150,000 to FRW 500,000 depending on an individual’s 
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rank.128 Some of this money is pulled together by some members of ex-combatants to 
form a project. Thus, the program initiates expansion and support of those projects. 
 In Rwanda ex-combatants have established social networks and interaction 
through participation in communal activities: attending marriages, helping in case of 
emergencies, and attending rituals and funerals. In this case the program has taken this 
advantage to enhance and strengthen the relationship of ex-combatants and civilian 
population in their communities. In particular the program finances and supports 169 
projects around the country such as burial sites, private parking lots and restaurants. 
These projects are jointly owned by the civilians and ex-combatants. In communities, for 
example, statistics indicate the levels of social-economic reintegration of ex-combatants: 
those who interact with fellow ex-combatants, 85.1%; good interaction within 
communities, 82.2%; trust within communities, 64.1%; ex-combatants involved in 
associations, 33.6%, others are involved in public works and causal labor. About 63% of 
these associations are based in provinces outside Kigali city.129 
These figures partly depict the effectiveness of these projects and associations in 
Rwanda, unlike other post-conflict situations where the majority of ex-combatants 
concentrate in the suburbs of the capital city as seen in cases of Liberia and South Africa. 
In addition the figures also indicate the level of acceptance on the part of the receiving 
community. Furthermore, because of effective deviation of war resources into social and 
economic assets, defense spending was reduced from 4.3% of GDP in 1998 to 2.1% of 
GDP in 2005, save to state total security within and along Rwandan borders.130  
Consequently, this indicates that the level of social and economic reintegration of ex-
combatants is above average. 
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In the event that ex-combatants are not employed or their welfare is not good, it 
may be attributed to an unemployment factor of 70% of all Rwandans in general. Also 
this may be attributed to individual social incompetence as well as disabilities due to 
sickness or war. Nevertheless, the program supports those groups through a vulnerable 
support window (VSW) as discussed in the section of exit strategy. 
4. DDR Duration, Timeline vis-a-vis Reconciliation And Stability  
The DDR model in Rwanda started in 1994 when members of ex-FAR who were 
either captured or had surrendered were integrated into the ranks of the RPA. The DDR 
process in Rwanda was not driven by time, but instead was created as a deliberate process 
to achieve unity and reconciliation. Promoting reconciliation is a process that requires 
patience and enough time in order to build trust among the victims and the perceived 
assailants. The program was also designed to produce gradual, rather than immediate, 
results because it would seems unrealistic for an ex-combatant who had spent 10-20 years 
fighting, and who had decided to kill, to be released after five days in cantonment camps 
to join the rest of the civilian society, as were the cases of Liberia, Angola, and, recently, 
Burundi. In these countries, ex-combatants were discharged without social, political, or 
economic orientation to civilian life. Without the expanded ingango training, ex-
combatants are more likely to transfer all values and behaviors they possess into the 
civilian society. Large-scale violent conflict may end, but serious criminal activities will 
reign and no stability will be achieved within communities. By promoting DDR programs 
that promote rapid reintegration rather than education before reintegration, the 
practitioners will not have helped the ex-combatant to integrate into society, the nation, 
or the civilian population where the ex-combatant will be settled. Consequently, neither 
stability nor societal reconciliation will be achieved and efforts geared at achieving peace 
by the international community will be in vain.   
5. Organization and Structure of the RDRP 
 The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) is coordinated 
by the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) which is the 
central organization that oversees all activities of the program and is answerable to the 
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Ministry of Finance.131 The Commission also has offices and representatives at 
provincial, district and community levels of the local government affiliated with the local 
administration at various levels. The organization is staffed with active military, ex-
combatants, and civilians hired on the basis of competence, skills and experience in DDR 
and other related reintegration activities regardless of their nationality.132 
Funds and personnel are under the direct control of the provincial administration 
and other levels of the administrative governance. In addition finances, economic projects 
and small projects’ associations of both civilians and ex-combatants are integral parts of 
the overall development plan of the local government. The Commission is responsible for 
technical assistance and skills development at different levels of the government in 
coordination with the local authorities. Thus, the ex-combatants become integrated in the 
national economic system from the strategic to local levels.  
 The intricacy of the RDRP organization and structure in part enables the 
integration of projects of ex-combatants into economic projects of civilians at various 
levels of the government. Also it indirectly mingles the ex-combatants with the civilians 
in the community, which in turn facilitates interaction and consequently enhances societal 
reconciliation.  
 Also the program has an informal link to the National Unity Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC). Why is the RDRC not formally under the office of the NURC? 
The reasons are that, first, the NURC oversees unity and reconciliation across 
government structures and society strata rather than focusing on the DDR program as one 
of its main components. Also, as Ltc. John Zigira argues, it is the task of RDRP to 
demilitarize ex-combatants, go through the process of demobilization and later release the 
ex-combatants to NURC in the communities where they will reside.133 Third, the NURC 
consistently plays a major role during the sensitization phase, in ingando. Lastly, after 
demobilization and reintegration into society, the NURC conducts educational programs 
for ex-combatants. This time they are mixed with other civilians. This facilitates 
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integration between ex-combatants and civilians. This may also, in part, assist in 
explaining why reconciliation values become entrenched into ex-combatants in their 
communities.134  
6. Facets of RDRP 
 The program is composed of three main phases that follow ingando: 
demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants. Each phase of the 
program carries out an intensive sensitization program on prevention and mitigation of 
HIV/AIDS. In addition the program caters to special and vulnerable groups, such as 
women and children, and those who are victims of HIV/AIDS.135 
 The beneficiaries of the RDRP are the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaise (ex-FAR), 
armed groups (different armed factions that were formed in eastern DRC after genocide), 
and members of the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF). The RDF is an integrated 
government force of both former ex-FAR and RPA. So far, in stage II of the program 
36,754 ex-combatants have been demobilized and reinserted into society (see Table 3)136 
and they are now being reintegrated into the national economic system. However, 60,000 
ex-combatants have been demobilized and reintegrated in the civilian society in stages I 










                                                 
134 Interview with Fatuma Ndangiza, the Executive Secretary of the Rwanda National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission, (Kigali, March 29, 2006). 
135 World Bank Report, 15-26. 
136 “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization 
and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Secretariat Implementation and Support Mission Report,” Aide-







Table 4.   Number of Ex-combatants Demobilized in stage II: Dec. 2001 – Dec. 31, 2005 
Demobilization 
(Stage II only) 
Dec 2001 – Dec 2004 2005 Total 
RDF:   - Adult male 
            - Adult female 
16,574 
       17 
2,212 
       2 
 
Sub-total  16,591 2,214 18,805 
Armed groups: 
  - Adult male 
  - Adult female  
  - Child male 
  - Child female 
    
  4,483 
        26 
      543 
          2 
   
   577 
       1 
      25 
        0 
 
Sub-total   5,054     603  5,657 
EX-FAR:  - Adult male 
                  - Adult female 
12,085 
     203 
        0 
        0 
 
Sub-total 12,290         0 12,290 
Grand Total 33,937   2,817 36,754 

















Source: RDRC Office in Kigali 
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7. Exit Strategy 
The RDRP provides an exit strategy for when the program finishes. For instance 
the program links ex-combatants in different fields to related ministries in the 
government. The exit strategy helps ex-combatants to fully integrate into the mainstream 
of the economic system of the country. This prevents the collapse of the already standing 
economic infrastructure and social relations. In this case ex-combatants with HIV/AIDS, 
chronic diseases and victims of the war with disabilities who have failed to cope with 
civilian life; the program gives them more financial assistance to start new projects 
within their capacities. So far the project takes care of 2,400 disabled ex-combatants; 
meanwhile they negotiate transition to related line ministries and commissions such as 
HIV/AIDS Commission and local government.137  
Among the vulnerable groups who are the beneficiaries of the vulnerable support 
window (VSW) are the ex-child soldiers and women. The VSW is a fund used to improve 
on the welfare and project support of vulnerable groups such as ex-child soldiers and 
women, the sick with chronic diseases, and victims of HIV/AIDS. So far the program has 
demobilized 570 child soldiers in stage II, who were found in the armed groups from the 
Congo forest. It currently provides reintegration support through vocational training 
(41%), income-generating activities such as farming and petty trade (32.5%), and formal 
education (26.5%).138 As for gender, women ex-combatants are linked to relevant line 
ministries and civil society programs.139 This guaranties continuity and sustainability of 
social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into normal life in civilian society.  
 However, exit strategies in conventional DDR programs have been neglected and 
yet, are a major issue in the endless post-conflict instability. For instance, practitioners at 
times set unrealistic timetables as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The program 
becomes time-driven rather then addressing the root cause of the conflict in a deliberate 
way that will allow for gradual reconciliation and demilitarization of the minds of ex-
combatants. Partly, this may help explain the failure of the international organizations, 
                                                 
137 Technical Annex, 21-25. 
138 “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization 
and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Secretariat Implementation and Support Mission Report,” Aide-
memoire-IDA Credit # 3634, MPRP/MDTF # 52159, (Kigali, February 3, 2006), 6. 
139 Ibid, 7. 
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NGO’s and other practitioners involved in post-conflict situations to effectively live up to 
the DDR program’s expectations of sustainable peace. 
 Therefore, a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program that takes 
place after a deliberate and thorough sensitization program for ex-combatants, when 
coupled with detailed and feasible exit strategies, will not only enhance societal 
reconciliation, but will also act as a mitigating factor for conflict influence factors in 
post-conflict situations. 
 E. CONCLUSION 
  This chapter discussed the dilemma of punishment versus societal reconciliation 
in post-genocide Rwanda. It analyzed the impact of ingando, military integration, and 
reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian society in post-1994 Rwanda. Through 
this analysis, the chapter argued that the ingando model of sensitization is a prerequisite 
for successful military integration as well as reintegration of ex-combatants into the 
civilian society because it enhances behavioral change, demilitarizes the mind, and 
deconstructs enemy image. As far as integrating ex-combatants into the national military 
is concerned, the chapter concludes that this is an indispensable and a viable affirmative 
action that assures the society of group and individual safety, and eliminates fear thereby 
aiding reconciliation. Moreover, in ethnic conflicts, the military is viewed as the mirror of 
the society and a trust builder in a divided society. Whereas a comprehensive 
reintegration program for both ex-combatants and victor forces into the society acts as an 
agent of values transfer, such as reconciliation values learnt in ingando and ex-soldiers 
identifying themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi. This facilitates interaction 
within the society, and hence makes it possible for societal reconciliation. Also a 
comprehensive program assures ex-combatants of a sustainable welfare through viable 
exit strategies that mitigates conflict influence factors such as lack of education for young 
men and unemployment.  
 Thus, military integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes a 
deliberate sensitization program will not only enhance stability and societal 
reconciliation, but also changes the culture of hate and despair into a culture of hope and 





Civil wars continue to devastate countries around the world. However, neither the 
victory of one group nor negotiated settlement of the conflict has resulted in total 
stability. Conflict may resurface when the defeated group is marginalized or excluded 
from the political and economic structures and institutions of the new government. The 
fact is that, regardless of the cause of the conflict, the consequences of the war are the 
same: refugees, casualties, absence of rule of law, exclusion of certain ethnic groups and 
ethnic division. Thus, conflict resolution strategies should be geared toward achieving 
stability and unity within the society. One method of reaching a lasting peace is to ensure 
participation by all competing factions in a new government.  One aspect of this 
participation is to make certain that the new government’s military forces fully integrate 
members from all parties in the previous conflict. Therefore, a properly conducted 
program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration (DDRI) of 
warring factions is a major aspect of post-conflict security building that ensures 
sustainable stability and reconciliation in societies devastated by civil war. Also, the 
success of DDRI is a function of an intensive and comprehensive sensitization program 
delivered to ex-combatants before reintegration into the society. It also incorporates 
integration into the nation’s military as was the case of ingando in post-conflict DDRI in 
Rwanda. 
B. FINDINGS  
The DDR concept begun at the end of the Cold War in 1989 as an international 
community’s effort to end violent conflicts in countries plagued by civil war, insurgency, 
and ethnic conflicts especially in Africa and Latin America. The conventional program of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is composed of three models. 
Those models are conducted in two main phases: the short-medium phase that focuses on 
the disarmament, demobilization, and integration process of ex-combatants, and the long-
term phase that deals with the reintegration process of ex-combatants into civilian life. 
The first DDRI model is the consent-based model. This model is based on a 
comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties, and is usually 
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conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb some 
guerrilla forces, or they may merge the two warring factions to form a single national 
military force. It is important to note here that, although this model of DDRI is conducted 
after the conclusion of hostilities, the security situation usually remains fragile.   
The second case is complete demobilization: the government decides to downsize 
its military through normal channels of DDR, but does not include former enemy 
combatants in its forces. For instance, in 1991, Ethiopia completely demobilized former 
government forces of the Derg regime following the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam, 
and refused to include some members in their force.   
The last is the coercive model of DDR. It involves forced disarmament of 
insurgents and is carried out by external intervention under a United Nations’ mandate. 
The most recent case was the disarmament of Somalia factions in 1993. In the first phase 
of this operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture a large number of weapons. 
Nevertheless, the operation ended in a disaster. So, the intended objectives to secure the 
environment for humanitarian operations, national reconciliation, and economic 
reconstruction were not achieved in Somalia. Although these dimensions of DDRI have 
not been properly carried out in the past, they form an integral part of the overall post-
conflict security building program. The failure of DDR programs may be attributed to 
challenges presented by the fluid structure of an international system in which critical 
issues necessary for the success of the program, such as funding and coordinating DDR 
activities become problems.  
Despite the challenges mentioned above, the DDRI model is useful to apply when 
addressing fundamental issues that might have caused the war in states formerly 
weakened or fractured by sectarian violence. This is because DDRI possesses the 
capability to yield stability and reconciliation through proper integration and reintegration 
of ex-combatants. In the case of stability, DDRI converts the conflict war resources into 
economic development tools. It also develops human capital (ex-combatants) and 
regulates conflict influence factors, thus providing suitable conditions for societal 
reconciliation.   
As far as military professionalism is concerned, DDRI has many benefits.  It 
promotes healthy civil-military relations. By doing so, it has the potential to significantly 
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reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by violent 
inter-communal conflicts. Furthermore, it enhances combat capability and efficiency to 
protect the nation against external aggression. Consequently, it encourages representation 
in the military, which gradually translates into societal reconciliation. Therefore, in the 
effort to foster reconciliation between former adversaries, DDRI is useful because it 
enhances social, economic, and political reintegration of ex-combatants into the new 
regime.  
In addition, the DDRI process converts the ex-combatants who were regarded as 
spoilers into productive economic actors. It removes weapons, ammunition and mines 
from circulation, and redirects resources that have been used to support the war effort 
towards the peacetime economy. Demobilization removes a large number of fighting 
personnel and converts them into productive members of the society. If these ex-
combatants and weapons are not removed from circulation they not only cause severe 
damage to human life, but also make post-conflict societal reconstruction difficult. 
However, this chapter argues that a well conducted DDR process removes all those 
uncontrolled war resources from the theatre and restores peace and stability in the 
troubled regions, which creates conditions for possible societal reconciliation. As a result, 
DDRI amalgamates warring factions into a single national force. This approach promotes 
security in that all different ethnic groups should be represented in the military as was the 
case of Mozambique, South Africa, and Rwanda. 
As for civil-military relations and societal reconciliation, military integration 
builds a representative, and professional military which is not easily manipulated by 
politicians for their own interests. In accomplishing this task, military integration and 
professionalism have the potential significantly to reduce the occurrence of further 
internal strife in states previously afflicted by ethnic violence, and enhance a combat 
effective military that is able to protect the nation against external aggression. Also, this 
thesis discussed the role of an ethnically homogenous military in propagating ethnic 
hatred and promoting ethnic division. In Rwanda, the Hutu military directly or indirectly 
participated in series of massacre of the Tutsi since 1959, to include the horrific 1994 
genocide. Chapter III discussed the role of the military and ethnic violence in pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed the origin of ethnic 
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groups in Rwanda; it pointed out that ethnicity and ethnic identity were stereotyped and 
given to Rwandans by early explorers, missionaries, and entrenched by colonialists. Also 
the chapter analyzed factors that led to politicized military in Rwanda between 1959 and 
1994: ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, domestic deployment, lack of 
urgency, and creation of parallel forces. Lastly, in Rwanda, an ethnically homogenous 
military participated in the series of massacres of the Tutsi, including the 1994 genocide. 
Consequently, this impacted negatively on post-conflict DDRI in Rwanda.   
 The DDRI in Rwanda has been the one of the successful cases. In addition to 
components of the traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the 
Rwandan case firstly, incorporates reconciliation values of integrating defeated former 
enemy forces into the national military despite its direct or indirect role in the atrocities 
committed to the Tutsi since 1959 to include genocide. Second, DDRI in Rwanda 
conducts a comprehensive sensitization program in solidarity camps known as ingando. 
Lastly, the program has an elaborate exit strategy to support vulnerable groups when the 
program ends. 
ingando is a sensitization mechanism for ex-combatants which deconstructs the 
enemy image, promotes behavior change, and analyses the basis of ethnic prejudice 
before ex-combatants are either integrated into the military or reintegrated into civilian 
society. This is done through intensive educational programs on social, political, and 
economic aspects of government and society. Military integration refers to a tangible 
affirmative action that eliminates fear, and builds trust and confidence between ex-
combatants and their fellow ethnic groups. Reintegration acts as an agent of value 
transfer, and facilitates interaction because ex-combatants who are encouraged to view 
themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi – thus enhancing reconciliation. This 
thesis, however, argues that ingando is a rehabilitation and reconciliation tool intended to 
accomplish several things: transform negative perceptions that cause ethnic hatred; 
mitigate conflict influence factors such as fear and exclusion; manage defeat, shame, and 
remorse for those who committed atrocities; and erase myths and erroneous theories of 
ethnic differences of the type discussed in Chapter III. Furthermore, it eliminates fear and 
illusive perception, and consequently restores hope, instills confidence, and creates a 
more responsible and patriotic Rwandan.   
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  The thesis discussed the dilemma of punishment versus societal reconciliation in 
post-genocide Rwanda. It analyzed the impact of ingando, military integration, and 
reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian society in post-1994 Rwanda. It pointed 
out that the ingando model of sensitization is a prerequisite for successful military 
integration as well as reintegration of ex-combatant.  As far as integrating ex-combatants 
into the national military is concerned, the thesis concludes that this is an indispensable 
and a viable affirmative action that assures the security of ethnic groups and individual 
safety, and eliminates fear thereby aiding reconciliation. Moreover, in ethnic conflicts, 
the military is viewed as the mirror of the society and a trust builder in a divided society. 
This facilitates interaction within the society, and hence makes it possible for societal 
reconciliation. Also, a comprehensive DDRI program assures ex-combatants of a 
sustainable economic reintegration through viable exit strategies that mitigates conflict 
influence factors such as lack of education for young men, and unemployment. Thus, 
military integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes a deliberate sensitization 
program will not only enhance stability and societal reconciliation, but also changes the 
culture of hate and despair into a culture of hope and peace. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT 
 Every post-conflict situation is unique depending on the country’s social, 
economic, and political features as well as the magnitude of the destruction in areas 
devastated by war. However, there are some basics that are applicable to all situations 
that might assist practitioners in their efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts in post-
conflict situations in general and DDRI. They include: 
- The DDRI program should be organized by the indigenous efforts and supported by the 
international community and by international financial institutions. This not only 
supports the indigenous nation financially, but it also promotes transparency and 
accountability; 
- A sensitization program for ex-combatants in ingando before integration into the 
military and reintegration into the civilian society is an indispensable element that 
determines the success of DDRI program;  
- The integration of ex-combatants into the military is an important factor that ensures 
representation and guarantees individual and group safety in post-conflict situation; 
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- The political will on the part of the leadership is also an essential aspect for the success 
of the DDRI program; 
- During the reintegration program, economic projects of ex-combatants should form an 
integral part of developmental activities of the local government. The follow on support 
should be decentralized to province and district level; 
- The exit strategy should be put into consideration earlier in the planning process for a 
complete transition from DDRI program to civilian life in case the program is terminated. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In sum, military integration is an important factor for stability and societal 
reconciliation in post-conflict situations. It ensures representation of different groups of 
society into the military, thus, dispelling fear and promoting confidence more especially 
on the part of the losers. In addition DDRI promotes military professionalism which in 
turn enhances combat capability and efficiency, as well as health civil-military relations. 
Furthermore, military integration and reintegration that precedes a comprehensive 
sensitization program of ex-combatants is an important aspect that leads to the success of 
DDRI program. Consequently, for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation, DDRI 
program should have a comprehensive exit strategy that will take care of some elements 
of ex-combatants who have failed economically to reintegrate into the society, such as 
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